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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
This Court, having granted Mr. Osborne's Petition for Writ of Certiorari, has
jurisdiction over the instant matter both under its original jurisdiction to grant extraordinary
writs, Utah Code Annot. § 78-2-2(2) (Supp. 2001) and its appellate jurisdiction on certiorari
under Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-3 (Supp. 2001), and Rule 45, Utah R. App. Proc.
STATEMENT OF ISSUES / STANDARDS OF REVIEW
1.

Whether Utah law, the Utah Constitution and the federal constitution require

personal jurisdiction over a nonresident parent, who has no contacts with Utah, prior to
terminating his or her parental rights pursuant to an adoption. On certiorari of an original
petition, this Court reviews the decision of the Court of Appeals, which this Court reviews
for correction of error.
This issue was raised in the Original Petition and Memorandum in support thereof in
the Utah Court of Appeals.
2.

Whether the so-called "status" exception applies to termination of parental

rights proceedings incident to adoption. On certiorari of an original petition, this Court
reviews the decision of the Court of Appeals, which this Court reviews for correction of
error.
This issue was raised in the Original Petition and Memorandum in support thereof in
the Utah Court of Appeals, and in the Adoption Center of Choice's response thereto.
3.

Whether the failure to afford a nonresident putative father a meaningful

opportunity to raise jurisdictional defenses violates both the Utah Constitution and the federal
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constitution.
This issue was raised in the Original Petition and Memorandum in support thereof in
the Utah Court of Appeals.
DETERMINATIVE AUTHORITY
The constitutional provisions, statutes, ordinances, rules, regulations, or case law
whose interpretation is determinative, are set out verbatim, with the appropriate citation, in
this brief.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This case deals with an issue of national scope: to what extent can the State extend
its power to conduct and finalize adoptions under the due process clauses of the state and
federal due process constitutions, and must it have personal jurisdiction over nonresident
natural fathers in order to do so? Also, must it provide a meaningful and effective
mechanism for natural fathers to raise a personal jurisdiction defense to such proceedings?
A. Statement of Facts7
Mr. Osborne is a North Carolina resident with no contacts with Utah. He entered into
a relationship with Angela Baker in November of 2000, and in December, 2000, she became
pregnant. Mr. Osborne resolved then to provide for the new child and regarded the new

1

The background facts stated herein are taken from Mr. Osborne's sworn petition
filed on February 14, 2001 in the Fourth Judicial District Court of Utah County under the
Utah Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Enforcement Act (UCCJEA), Utah Code Ann.
§§ 78-45c-101 to -318 (2001), unless otherwise noted. The procedural facts cite to
exhibits originally submitted to the Court of Appeals, except for Exhibits 36-41, which
postdate that record, Exhibit 42, which is provided for the Court's convenience. All of
these exhibits are in the Petitioner's Appendix. The UCCJEA petition is Exhibit 1.
o

child, Ms. Baker and her son, D.J., as a family unit for which he was responsible.
In January, 2001, Mr. Osborne bought a new home in Stanley, North Carolina. He
moved into this home along with Ms. Baker and D.J. In February, 2001, Ms. Baker was
instructed by her doctor to be on bed rest because her pregnancy was regarded by her
physician as being high risk. She followed the doctor's instructions and continued to live in
the home Mr. Osborne has purchased.
In March, 2001, Ms. Baker's mother moved into the house. Mr. Osborne agreed to
support her. Ms. Baker continued to live in Mr. Osborne's home through July, 2001. It was
during this month that Ms. Baker first called an adoption agency called An Act of Love. Mr.
Osborne discovered that she had made contact with the adoption agency and expressed his
disapproval. Ms. Baker represented at that point that she would not place the baby for
adoption and attributed her actions to the fact that her psychiatric medications were
apparently not working properly. Later that night, she checked herself into the local mental
health center uttering suicide threats.
After Ms. Baker returned from the mental health center and moved back into the
home, Mr. Osborne continued his work schedule. One day at work he was informed by a
neighbor that Ms. Baker and her mother had moved out. Mr. Osborne contacted Ms. Baker's
aunt, who informed him that she had flown to Utah where a doctor had induced labor and
where she was about to place the baby for adoption.
On August 6,2001, Ms. Baker called Mr. Osborne at work from Utah. She told him
that she had borne a son and that she was coming home with the baby boy and D.J. On
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August 7, 2001, she traveled back to North Carolina. The child was in Utah for one day.
Upon returning, Ms. Baker went to her mother's home for one week. She then
indicated that she wished to return to the residence Mr. Osbome had purchased. Mr. Osbome
and his father moved Ms. Baker and her mother back into the home.
From August to October, 2001, Ms. Baker, Mr. Osbome, D.J. and Ms. Baker's mother
lived together in Mr. Osborne's home. Ms. Baker and Mr. Osbome had a number of
conversations regarding the fact that the child did not bear Mr. Osborne's name. During this
time, Ms. Baker would continue to have episodes of emotional or psychological distress. She
would act out inappropriately and occasionally throw things. Mr. Osbome ascribed her
conduct to her psychological condition.
During this entire time, D.J., Ms. Baker's son, and the baby boy developed a bonding
relationship. Also during the time between August and October, 2001, Mr. Osbome took
over the responsibility of maintaining bookkeeping responsibilities for the family. Their
financial situation thereafter started to improve. Mr. Osbome enlisted the help of his mother
in order to balance the family books.
In November and December, 2001, the financial situation of the family continued to
improve. Ms. Baker would from time to time express dissatisfaction with not being in
control of the books, but the financial situation was improving. D J. and the baby continued
to develop a bonding relationship during this time. Thanksgiving 2001 was celebrated with
Ms. Baker's family. Mr. Osbome cooked and prepared the Thanksgiving meal. This was at
Ms. Baker's family's residence in Stanley, North Carolina.

A

In early December, 2001, in an effort to rectify the fact that the child was not named
after Mr. Osborne, he twice secured a blank Affidavit for Voluntary Declaration of Paternity
for execution under North Carolina law. Ms. Baker signed both of these documents but then
became distressed and ripped the documents up.
During the month of December, 2001, Mr. Osborne and Ms. Baker's relationship
deteriorated. Even so, Mr. Osborne and Ms. Baker continued to cohabit in Mr. Osborne's
home, and Mr. Osborne continued to provide for Ms. Baker, D.J. and the baby. In midDecember of 2001, the relationship deteriorated to the point that Ms. Baker took D.J. and the
baby and moved out of the house and took many of the possessions of both Ms. Baker and
Mr. Osborne with her, including Mr. Osborne's tools of trade. Upon leaving, Ms. Baker also
did damage to the house.
On December 15,2001, Ms. Baker contacted Mr. Osborne's mother and asked if she
could take the baby to the hospital for an ear infection and respiratory distress. She also
indicated that she needed those items that she was accustomed to Mr. Osborne providing
(diapers, gas drops, formula, etc.). Mr. Osbome complied with these requests.
On December 28, 2001, Ms. Baker came to Mr. Osborne's home and picked up
Christmas presents that had been purchased by Mr. Osborne for both D.J. and for the baby.
December 28,2001, was the last time that Mr. Osbome has seen the baby. In early January,
2002, he received a number of calls from Ms. Baker, care of his stepmother, Sandra Bridges,
who took calls for Mr. Osborne. These messages demonstrate that Mr. Osborne was an
active care giver and that he could not have known that Ms. Baker had surreptitiously

traveled from Utah to North Carolina to pl^ce Kenneth for adoption until after she had
relinquished him to the Adoption Center of Choice.2 Exhibit 1 and Exhibit 36 of the
Appellant's Appendix.
Upon discovering that Ms. Baker had placed Kenneth for adoption, Mr. Osborne
called the Department of Social Services in Gastonia, North Carolina and spoke with Patricia
L. Hovis. He also contacted The Adoption Center of Choice for information regarding the
adoption and was given none.
In his communication with The Adoption Center of Choice, Mr. Osborne was
informed that the child had been placed with a set of adoptive parents located in the State of
Utah. This communication confirmed further representations made by the natural mother,
Ms. Baker.
The agency and/or adoptive parents failed to secure the approval of the North Carolina
or Utah administrator of the Interstate Compact for the Placement of Children before the
filing of the adoption petition in question.

2

Ms. Baker left the following messages:
•
Saturday, December 30, 2001, at 8:03 p.m. requesting clothes and diapers
for Kenneth and saying she could talk about that the next day.
•
Thursday, January 3, 2002, at 9:34 PM, complaining about Mr. Osborne's
request for his tools.
•
Tuesday, January 8, 2002, at 11:58 PM, indicating that the car was hers
before she left for Utah.
•
Thursday, January 10, 2002, at 10:36 AM, indicating that Mr. Osborne
cannot fight the state of Utah.
Petitioner's Appendix Exhibit 36 and sound recording (part of the record in the
Court of Appeals).
fi

B. Statement of Proceedings Below
On February 14,2002, Mr. Osborne filed a petition under the UCCJEA, challenging
the subject matter jurisdiction of Utah courts over the adoption of his son, Kenneth Skyler
Baker, and the termination of his parental rights through that adoption. In the petition, Mr.
Osborne specifically disavowed seeking any substantive relief from the state court; he only
challenged the court's subject matter jurisdiction. This challenge was predicated on the fact
that neither Mr. Osborne nor the child were residents of the State of Utah, and that the child
had been transported to Utah unlawfully. Exhibit 1.
In his petition, Mr. Osborne alleged that the birth mother traveled to Utah to place
Kenneth for the specific purpose of placing the child, all in violation of the Interstate
Compact for the Placement of Children.3 Exhibit 1.
Mr. Osborne did not attempt to collaterally attack the adoption now pending in the
State of Utah.

The petition was narrowly tailored under the UCCJEA to compel a

jurisdictional self-examination by the court in which the petition was filed. Exhibit 1.
Mr. Osborne filed along with his UCCJEA petition an Ex Parte Motion to Open
Adoption File under Utah Code Annot. § 78-30-15, requesting that the court disclose the
case number of the pending adoption proceeding, wherever in the state it might be, in order
to identify the adoptive parents and to determine the status of the proceeding that had been
occurring in derogation of his rights. Exhibit 2 and Exhibit 3.
The District Court refused to issue such an order, but instructed the clerk of only the
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Utah Code Annot. § 62A-4a-701 through -709 (2002).
7

Fourth Judicial District to search the court records for an adoption concerning Kenneth
Skyler Baker III. The court stated that it did not have the power to compel clerks in other
districts to conduct such a search, or to divulge the information requested. Exhibit 4.
On February 19, 2002, Mr. Osborne filed a motion to reconsider (Exhibit 5), which
was supported by a memorandum (Exhibit 6) and affidavit (Exhibit 7). The gravamen of the
motion was that the court unreasonably restricted the scope of the search for information
concerning the adoption case so as to render it meaningless. Accompanying these documents
was a motion for order to show cause as to why the Adoption Center of Choice ("the
agency") should not divulge the identifying information of the adoptive parents. Exhibit 8.
The court denied the motion that same day, and suggested in its denial that Mr.
Osborne subpoena the information from the agency. Minute entry (Exhibit 9).
Mr. Osborne accepted the court's suggestion and served a subpoena upon the agency
in order to secure the identities of the adoptive parents so that they might be served with a
copy of the petition. The agency was not a named party in the petition. Exhibit 10.
The agency filed a motion to quash. Exhibit 11 and Exhibit 12. Mr. Osbome
responded in a hearing convened two days after the agency's response was filed. Exhibit 13.
Mr. Osborne also filed a supplemental memorandum, which advised the court of a recent
ruling concerning the limits of personal jurisdiction. That supplemental memorandum
expressly stated that Mr. Osbome did not at that point raise a personal jurisdiction challenge,
but that the court should be aware of the limits of personal jurisdiction and how those limits
favored Mr. Osborne's chances of prevailing. Exhibit 14. The agency filed a response,
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(Exhibit 15), and Mr. Osborne replied (Exhibit 16).
The court ultimately granted the motion to quash. It stated (Exhibit 17) that the
UCC JEA did not apply, and further opined that plaintiffs claims would be barred under the
Utah Adoption Code were he to challenge the adoption.
Mr. Osborne never raised the adoption code in his petition, but rather, in the course
of attempting to quash the subpoena, the defendant Adoption Center of Choice raised the
adoption code as a defense. Mr. Osborne never responded to the Adoption Center's
challenge to plaintiffs legal rights under the adoption code, it being his consistent contention
that an inquiry into the code's application to him was irrelevant. The Fourth Judicial District
Court for Utah County issued dicta in the memorandum decision regarding the adoption
code, dicta that clearly exceeded the narrow scope of Mr. Osborne's UCC JEA petition.
Furthermore, the court's ruling was not final, but was an interim ruling regarding a motion
to quash a subpoena served on a nonparty.
Because the UCCJEA petition was never served on a party, Mr. Osborne dismissed
it under rule 41 on March 27, 2002. Exhibit 18. The court subsequently signed an order
quashing the subpoena on April 4, 2002, the last action occurring in the case. Exhibit 19.
On March 8, 2002, the Adoption Center of Choice filed a Petition for Determination
of Birth Father's Rights with the Fourth Judicial District Court of Utah County, case no.
022400054. Exhibit 20.
Counsel for the Adoption Center sent a letter on March 11,2002, to Phillip E. Lowry,
counsel to Mr. Osborne in his UCCJEA petition. The letter requested that Mr. Lowry accept
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service on behalf of Mr. Osborne. The letter also stated that if service were not accepted "I
will arrange for [Mr. Osborne] to receive notice." Exhibit 21.
Mr. Lowry refused to accept service and indicated to the Adoption Center in a letter
dated March 15,2002, that it would have to serve Mr. Osborne personally with the petition,
but that Mr. Lowry did not believe that this was even possible given that Mr. Osborne was
a North Carolina resident. Exhibit 22.
Accompanying the petition filed by the Adoption Center of Choice was a Notice of
Petition for Determination of Birth Father's Rights. This notice was directed to Frank
Osborne care of Phillip Lowry, Esq. Exhibit 23.
No proof of service regarding the petition for determination of birth father's rights has
ever been copied to Mr. Lowry, nor has any service been attempted upon Mr. Osborne in
North Carolina of any court documents, including the Adoption Petition or the Petition for
Determination of Birth Father's Rights.
On March 21, 2002, three days after the Memorandum Decision in the UCCJEA
action, the agency filed with the Fourth Judicial District Court in case 022400054, a Motion
to Allow Petition for Determination of Birth Father's Rights to Be Heard Without Notice.
Filed on the same day was a Notice to Submit the said motion. Exhibit 24, Exhibit 25, and
Exhibit 26.
The same day, March 21, 2002, the agency filed a Motion to Grant Petition for
Determination of Birth Father's Rights., Once again, the agency contemporaneously filed a
Notice to Submit this motion. Exhibit 27 and Exhibit 28.
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Neither of the motions nor notices to submit were copied to either Mr. Osborne or his
counsel, as reflected in the mailing certificates attached thereto.
Six days later, on March 27,2002, without having received any input whatsoever from
Mr. Osborne, the Fourth Judicial District Court issued a memorandum decision in case
022400054, in which he granted the agency's motion to have the pending petition heard ex
parte. Exhibit 29. This memorandum decision was not sent to Mr. Osborne or his counsel.
On April 8, 2002, the court executed in case 022400054 an Order Granting Motion
to Allow Petition for Determination of Birth Father's Rights to Be Heard without Notice,
which was an order of memorializing the findings and conclusions made in the memorandum
decision regarding the ex parte nature of the proceedings. A copy of this order is attached
as Exhibit 30. The next day, on April 9, 2002, the court issued an Order regarding Birth
Father's Rights, which declared affirmatively that Mr. Osborne had no rights with respect
to the pending Utah adoption. Exhibit 31.
Neither of these orders were sent to Mr. Osborne or his counsel. Indeed, after the
agency requested Mr. Osborne's counsel to accept service, it communicated no further with
either Mr. Osborne's counsel regarding the petition. Mr. Osborne and his counsel therefore
rightfully assumed that the agency was taking no further action on the matter. This proved
untrue, as the agency had filed an ex parte application, which was granted by the court, and
which unilaterally terminated Mr. Osborne's rights with no notice to him.
On April 4,2002, Mr. Osborne filed with the Utah federal court an action challenging
the constitutionality of Utah's construction of the Utah adoption code. Exhibit 32.
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Mr. Osborne's counsel first received notice of the April 8, 2002, order in the Fourth
Judicial District Court of Utah (the one that allowed determination of his parental rights ex
parte) when he received a copy of it in the mail on June 10, 2002. It was attached to the
agency's motion for summary judgment in the federal judicial proceeding. Exhibit 33.
On June 21,2002, Mr. Osborne filed a petition for extraordinary relief with the Utah
Court of Appeals, requesting that the court stay the adoption, reveal its location, and for a
declaration that he might intervene in the adoption without waiving his personal jurisdiction
defense. The Petition is attached hereto.
On June 28, 2002, Mr. Osborne submitted the affidavit of his stepmother, Sandra
Bridges, to the Court of Appeals to supplement the record therein. The affidavit was
accompanied by a compact disc of a message machine recording and a transcript thereof.
The recordings demonstrate that Mr. Osborne could not have know about the placement of
Kenneth in Utah until after relinquishment had occurred. Exhibit 36.
On July 1,2002, the General Court of Justice, District Court Division, Gaston County,
North Carolina, issued a Temporary Restraining Order in Frank Osborne v. Angela Catherine
Baker, Adoption Center of Choice, Inc, John Doe and Jane Doe, case no. 02 CvD 478,
restraining the adoptive parents or the agency from proceeding with the adoption. This was
originally attached to the Application for Extraordinary Relief filed with this Court on July
3,2002. Exhibit 37.
On July 2, 2002, the Court of Appeals, in a written opinion, denied the petition for
extraordinary relief. It reasoned that the mother's 24-hour stay in Utah placed Mr. Osbome

i?

on notice that he should comply with Utah law. Thus, he forfeited any right to notice or
consent, and personal jurisdiction over him was not required. The Court of Appeals opinion
is attached hereto in the Appendix to the Brief.
On July 3,2002, this Court granted an emergency stay on the adoption, and has now
converted that stay into a preliminary stay pending disposition.
On July 12,2002, Mr. Osborne's counsel secured the identity of the adoptive parents
and served them under Rule 4 of a Notice of Proceedings. Copies of these notices, along
with a return of service, are contained in the Supplemental Appendix as Exhibits 38 and 39.
Mr. Osborne's counsel advised the Court of this development. Exhibit 40. The Court has
since amended its caption accordingly.
On August 13, 2002, Mr. Osborne submitted to this Court a copy of a Preliminary
Injunction in the matter of Frank Osborne v. Angela Catherine Baker, Adoption Center of
Choice, Inc, John Doe and Jane Doe, case no. 02 CvD 478, along with a letter from the
Adoption Center filed with that court protesting the issuance of an injunction. Exhibit 41.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
In the 1990s, approximately 120,000 adoptions took place each year.4 The vast
majority of these were unproblematic. Some, however, were conducted in derogation of
rights of natural fathers, with the drastic consequence that family units established on the
backs of these fathers were, regrettably but appropriately, broken apart.

4

Jeanette Mills, Unwed Birthfathers and Infant Adoption: Balancing a Father's
Rights with the States Need for a Timely Surrender Process, 62 La. L. Rev. 615, 615 &
n.4 (2002).

n

In the midst of these highly publicized cases and reeling from this Court's criticism
and invalidation of portions of the then-applicable Utah Adoption Code, the Utah legislature
enacted one of the most aggressive Adoption Codes in the country with respect to the natural
father's responsibility to preserve and protect his rights. It did so without considering the due
process violations this legislation could inflict on non-Utah fathers whose children are
spirited into this state unlawfully (and, derivatively, the hardship wrought on adoptive parents
whose efforts would be dashed if an adoption were invalidated because of constitutional
violations).
The Adoption Code utterly fails to consider the non-Utah father who has no contacts
with the State of Utah. It purports to apply itself to any father whose child happens to be
placed for adoption in Utah, but contains no predicate for doing so. This is a violation of the
due process, which guarantees that citizens of one state are protected from being haled into
court in another state absent some contact with the first state. These requirements are not
modified or suspended merely because a child is involved.
Of further concern is that such natural fathers, being in the position to have to
affirmatively rebut a violation of their rights, are placed in jeopardy of waiving any challenge
to personal jurisdiction if they raise such a challenge in a Utah court. Not only is this a
further violation of the federal due process clause, but it also violates the due process and
open courts provisions of the Utah Constitution.
Mr. Osborne has suffered directly as a result of the Code's deficiencies. He developed
a substantial relationship with Kenneth, providing of the birth mother before Kenneth was
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born and holding Kenneth out as his own child, in his home, and providing for him, for the
first five months of Kenneth's life. His substantial and profound relationship with Kenneth
only exacerbates the due process jurisdictional violations he has suffered, and underscores
the unfairness of expecting all fathers, especially those who are not "deadbeat" or "scofflaw,"
from having to come to Utah not only claim their children, but to prove to a Utah court that
they have the right to do so.
ARGUMENT
I. UTAH HAS NO PERSONAL JURISDICTION OVER MR. OSBORNE, AND
THEREFORE CANNOT EXERCISE AUTHORITY OVER HIM OR APPLY ITS
ADOPTION LAW TO HIM.
A. Utah Must Have Personal Jurisdiction Over Nonresident Natural Fathers in
Adoption Proceedings
Adoption amounts to a termination proceeding,5 yet none of the procedural safeguards
attendant to termination are codified in the Utah Adoption Code, nor are generally
recognized as even being applicable to adoption. This is because adoption is generally
regarded as collusive, consent being required of the natural parent involved. Natural fathers
of children born out of wedlock ("putative fathers") are different, however. Traditionally,
their consents were not required at all. United States Supreme Court cases changed this view

5

"It is common, in considering adoption, to focus attention on . . . the formation of
the legal bond with the adoptive parents, but since in our legal system it is generally the
case that the parent-child relationship may exist with only one set of parents at a time,
adoption also necessarily involves the termination of the bond with the natural parents.
In some jurisdictions the two steps are accomplished by two separate lawsuits, the first
being referred to as a proceeding for termination of parental rights, the second as
adoption." Homer H. Clark, Jr., The Law of Domestic Relations in the United States §
20.1 at 850 (1988) (emphasis supplied).
1S

in the 1970s and 80s, however, affording putative fathers certain constitutional protections,
including the right to give consent for (or, alternatively, to veto) adoptions of their children.6
The outer limit to putative fathers' rights in adoptions was set in Lehr v. Robertson.7
In Lehr the Supreme Court stated that the physical role of being a father did not amount to
fatherhood. The latter, not the former, status was protected by the Constitution. Lehr placed
the burden of proving fatherhood on the putative father by doing acts consistent with
fatherhood. It also sanctioned legislatures' mandating what those acts should be, within
reasonable limits. The New York law at issue in Lehr stated that one of those acts should be
registering with a statewide registry of putative fathers.
Lehr allows state legislatures to presume that putative fathers have not demonstrated
fatherhood, with the putative father being allowed to rebut that presumption.8 In Utah, the
putative father of a child less than six months old must initiate a paternity action, file a notice
of doing so, register with a putative birth father registry, and render support to the mother
prenatally and to the child postnatally to rebut the legislative presumption that he has not

^Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 651-52 (1972)(law recognizes family relations,
even when the parents are not married; "the private interest... of a man in the children
he has sired and raised, undeniably warrants deference and, absent a powerful
countervailing interest, protection."); Cuban v. Mohammed, 441 U.S. 380, 382-83
(1979)(court strikes on equal protection grounds statute requiring natural mother's, but
not natural father's, consent to adoption).
7

463 U.S. 248, 261 (1983).

8

This echoes the notion, argued below, that the statute acts like a plaintiff, reaching
out and grabbing natural fathers, who are then required to adopt a defense posture.
16

demonstrated fatherhood.9 All of these things must be done before the natural mother
relinquishes custody of the child.
When the Lehr court deferred to the New York legislature, it continued a longstanding doctrine allowing states to regulate issues of domestic law, including placement of
children for adoption. Citation. Adoption law is accordingly balkanized, much as is tort law
and other areas of the law traditionally relegated to the states.l0 This is a recognition of state
sovereignty and the fact that the Constitution reserved such powers to the states.
Extending from this notion of state sovereignty is the notion that states have limits on
their jurisdiction and the reach of their laws under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment. While on its face such limits appear to restrict exercise of a state's raw power,
they in fact protect state sovereignty by preventing one state from treading on the domain of
another. As noted in Hanson v. Denckla, the requirements for personal jurisdiction "are more
than a guarantee of immunity from inconvenient or distant litigation. They are a consequence
of territorial limitations on the power of the respective States."11
Limits on state jurisdiction were at one time based almost exclusively on territoriality:
the state could exercise jurisdiction over whosoever or whatsoever was within its borders.12

9

Utah Code Annot.§ 78-30-4.14 (2002).

10

For a summary of state laws, see Karen C. Wehner, Daddy Wants Rights Too: a
Perspective on Adoption Statutes, 31 Hous. L. Rev. 690, 705-12 (1994); 1 ADOPTION
LAW AND PRACTICE (Joan H. Hollinger ed., 2002) Appendix 1-A (summary of all 50
states' major adoption provisions).
u

357 U.S. 235, 251 (1958).

n

Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714 (1877).
1*7

From this doctrine came hard cases that bore odd and rigid concepts and classifications.
Tiring of the odd constructs needed to patch the patch over the hole, the Supreme
Court adopted a jurisdictional construct based on fairness and contact with the forum: "Due
process requires only that in order to subject a defendant to a judgment in personam, if he be
not present within the territory of the forum, he have certain minimum contacts with it such
that the maintenance of the suit does not offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial
justice."13 Later, in Shaffer v, Heitner14, the court clarified that all jurisdictional inquiries
were to be assessed with the International Shoe criteria. Further clarifying those criteria, in
1985 the Court stated that minimum contact was not enough. A court must go on to evaluate
whether the nature and quality of the contacts make it "fair play and substantial justice" to
subject the defendant to jurisdiction there.15 The Court listed factors to be considered in
applying this last test, including plaintiffs interest, the statefs substantive policies, and
efficient administration of justice.16
From the other perspective, the Court stated it is insufficient that the requirements of
fair play and substantial justice are satisfied. The Court has held that minimum contacts
between the defendant and the forum are required even if the burden on the defendant was

"International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (l945)(quoting Milliken
v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457, 463 (1940)).
14

433U.S. 186(1977).

"Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 477-78 (1985).
]6

Id. at 476-77.
1 O

minimal, and thus fairness and substantial justice were met.17
The limits on state sovereignty imposed by the Due Process clause collide with the
Lehr presumption against fatherhood in the cases of putative fathers whose children are
transported from the putative father's state to another state and placed for adoption there.
While a putative father can be deemed to be on notice of the burden placed upon him by his
own state to rebut the Lehr presumption, he cannot be presumed to be on notice of the
requirements of every state to do so.

Indeed, those requirements vary wildly.18 In Mr.

Osborne's case, the fact that he had Kenneth in his home and cared for him for five months
means that his consent under North Carolina law is required for an adoption to take
place-why should he preoccupy himself that some other state may disregard his veto right?
State control of how to rebut the Lehr presumption breaks down in the case of
interstate placements. While the presumption may exist nationwide, the state law
requirements to rebut the presumption are hostage to the due process clause's personal
jurisdiction requirements. In other words, a putative father is required to rebut the Lehr
presumption only in a state that can exercise personal jurisdiction over him.
This makes sense. One invokes the Lehr presumption for a limited purpose: to
determine whether a putative father is entitled to notice and/or consent in an adoption
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World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 294 (1980)(contacts
cannot be fortuitous, and purposeful contact must be present even if the assertion of
jurisdiction meets the fairness test). The Court again separated these tests in Asahi Metal
Ind. v. Superior Court of California, Solano County, 480 U.S. 102, 108, 113 (1987).
18

See, e.g. Joan H. Hollinger, Adoption Procedure, in 1 ADOPTION LAW AND
PRACTICE § 4.01 (Hollinger ed., 2002).
19

proceeding. One does not invoke it to determine whether a state has jurisdiction over a
putative father, or whether a state's law applies to a putative father. Whether a man has
demonstrated fatherhood has nothing to do with a sovereign's control over his person. To
say otherwise inflates the Lehr presumption (there is no fatherhood relationship) to a larger
presumption that only local law may be used by the putative father to rebut the presumption.
As noted above, state sovereignty and due process limitations allow the putative father to
choose his mode of rebuttal consistent with his minimum contacts and notions of fair play
and substantial justice.

Lehr does not change this equation; it merely creates the

presumption, not the mode of rebuttal.
\Lehr
Putative fathers are presumed not to have
shown "fatherhood" unless they grasp the
opportunity to do so (by rebutting this
presumption)

International Shoe et al.

1

The sovereign states have the right to
define the ways putative fathers may rebut
the Lehr fatherhood presumption within
the confines of due process (minimum
contacts, fair play and substantial justice)

i
1
1
I
1

Lehr allows a nonfatherhood presumption, but that presumption only predicates
whether notices and consents are required; it is not a predicate for jurisdiction, that is,
application of the very laws that provide for such consents and notices. Jurisdiction is the
substrate over which the law lies-the mode of rebutting the Lehr presumption can only
operate after that substrate has cured and hardened, that is, after the state desiring to apply
its law has found a reason other than the putative father's status qua putative father to
exercise jurisdiction over him. The Lehr presumption is not a substitute for jurisdiction.
This view comports with applicable Supreme Court precedent, including the child
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custody case of May v. Anderson}9 Generally, it is impossible to give a child custody decree
full faith and credit because of its open and modifiable nature. Contemporary legislation,
such as the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Enforcement Act (UCCJEA)20 and its
predecessor, the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act (UCCJA),21 have attempted to
address this problem through a uniform process wherein the several states agree to give
custody determinations full faith and credit, with the approval of Congress in the form of
federal legislation (the Parental Kidnaping Prevention Act22).
None of this legislation, however, addresses the thorny issue of how a state can issue
a custody decree without first obtaining personal jurisdiction over the affected parties.23 May
took this issue head-on and concluded definitively that a custody decree entered without
personal jurisdiction over one of the parties could not be granted full faith and credit,
inasmuch as the issuance of the decree violated due process.
The May court analogized its decision to alimony decisions in which personal
jurisdiction is required in order to make decisions regarding property allocation. The court
reasoned that if personal jurisdiction is required in such cases, clearly when the far more
19

345 U.S. 528(1953).

20

Codified at Utah Code Annot. §§ 78-45c-101 to -318 (2001).

21

Formerly codified at Utah Code Annot. §§ 78-45c-l to -26 (1996).

22

28 U.S.C. § 1738A (Supp. 2001).

23

The UCCJEA brazenly states, "Physical presence of, or personal jurisdiction
over, a party or a child is neither necessary nor sufficient to make a child custody
determination." Utah Code Ann. § 78-45c-201(3) (2001). Thus, subject matter
jurisdiction is both a necessary and sufficient condition for personal jurisdiction under
this law.
21

weighty right of custody is adjudicated, personal jurisdiction is similarly required: "Rights
far more precious to appellant than property rights will be cut off if she is to be bound by the
Wisconsin award of custody."24
Dovetailing with May is Kulko v. Superior Court P The Court announced in Kulko
that even when the state has an interest in a child domiciled and present within it, the state's
sovereign interest does not permit it to assert jurisdiction in a support action over a parent
who lacks minimum contacts with the state. In Kulko a New York father was found to have
insufficient contacts with the state of California even though he had willingly sent his
children there to live with their mother (his ex-wife). The United States Supreme Court
reversed the California Supreme Court, which had stated that the father's sending his
daughter to California had an "effect" in California by which he had purposely avails himself
of the benefits of the forum.
The court stated that the mere act of sending the first child to California connoted
neither an intent to obtain or expectation to receive a corresponding benefit in that state. The
father's action had not been purposeful and volitional, but rather constituted mere
acquiescence in the event that had invoked the protection of the forum's law. Furthermore,
the cause of action arose not from the father's commercial transactions in interstate
commerce but rather from his personal, domestic relations. Furthermore, the father did not
purposely derive any financial benefit from the children's move to California. The court

^345 U.S. at 533.
;

436 U.S. 84(1977)
22

concluded
this single act [of allowing the first child to live with the mother] is surely not
one that are reasonable parent would expect to result in the substantial
financial burden and personal strain of litigating a child support sued in a
forum 3000 miles away, and we therefor seen no basis on which I can be said
that appellant could reasonably have anticipated been " haled before [a
California] court.26
The court also stated that any other approach to the problem would deter parents from
cooperating in custody arrangements that were in the best interests of the children.
Accordingly, the substantive policies underlying the action required that the courts find
clearly purposeful conduct on the part of the father before asserting jurisdiction. The court
emphasized that the state's interest, although substantial and legitimate, did not make
California a fair forum.27
B. The Utah Long-Arm Statute Does Not Allow Utah to Exercise Jurisdiction over
Mr. Osborne
Utah law reflects the federal standards. It imposes a two-part test to determine
whether a Utah court can exercise personal jurisdiction over a nonresident.28 First, the claim
against the nonresident must arise from activities enumerated in the Utah long-arm statute.29
Second, if the alleged acts come within the long-arm statute's reach, the nonresident
defendant's contacts must comport with the due process standards enumerated by

26

436 U.S. at 97.

27

436 U.S. at 93, 101.

^Anderson v. American Soc'y of Plastic & Reconstructive Surgeons, 807 P.2d 825,
826 (Utah 1990).
29

Id. at 826.
23

International Shoe and its progeny.
There is no question that Mr. Osborne' s actions do not fall within the long-arm statute.
The only sections remotely applicable to him are subsections (3) and (6), which state that
a nonresident submits himself to the jurisdiction of a Utah court when his of her purposeful
conduct gives raise to a claim of "tortious" conduct or "with respect for divorce, separate
maintenance, or child support... ."30 Apart from the fact that the statute completely omits
any reference to termination or adoption proceedings,31 Mr. Osborne had absolutely no
contact with Utah of any kind at the time Kenneth was placed for adoption. There is no
"purposeful" conduct that can act as predicate for the act to apply.
C. Utah Has No Basis to Exercise Personal Jurisdiction Over Mr. Osborne.
Nor are there minimum contacts sufficient to justify any exercise ofjurisdiction. This
discussion is necessarily short because of the complete lack of contacts whatsoever between
Mr. Osborne and Utah. Kenneth was kidnaped by his mother and brought here. There is not
even an acquiescence argument under such facts (as if such an argument would do any good

30

Utah Code Annot.§§ 78-27-24(3) and (6) (Supp. 2000).

31

The agency may argue that the Adoption Code, Utah Code Annot. §§ 78-30-1
through-19 (Supp. 2001), reflects the intent of the legislature to include nonresident
putative fathers within the scope of the long-arm statute, but nowhere in that Code is
there a jurisdictional statement to that effect. The legislature may have just assumed that
jurisdiction would be possible or proper, but this assumption amounts to little more than
an oversight. Because adoption amounts to a termination of parental rights proceeding,
this conclusion is supported by In re W.A., 2002 UT 72, (App.), cert, granted 48 P.3d 979
(2002)(holding that long-arm statute did not apply to termination proceedings). The
agency is further judicially estopped from arguing that the UCCJEA contains a basis for
expanding the reach of the long-arm statute, since it argued in Mr. Osborne's UCCJEA
proceeding (successfully) that the UCCJEA does not apply to adoptions.
94

under Kulko). Chromosome jurisdiction is not a recognized judicial doctrine.
Given this lack of contacts, an analysis of fairness or purposeful availment becomes
moot. Even if Kenneth's presence in the state were sufficient to be a "contact", imposing
jurisdiction on Mr. Osborne on this basis would be fundamentally unfair. It is simply beyond
question that Mr. Osborne could not reasonably anticipate being haled into court in Utah to
defend his parental rights.
The Court of Appeals' entire opinion is born on the back of one slender reed: Kenneth
was born here, so Mr. Osborne was bound to comply with Utah law. Thus, "chromosome
jurisdiction" was the basis of a purposeful availment and minimum contacts. Not that the
Court of Appeals ever articulated such reasoning: it must be inferred. Implicit or express,
the reasoning is flawed. Kenneth having been born here and present here for 24 hours simply
is not the basis for personal jurisdiction over Mr. Osborne.
The Court of Appeals also erred in characterizing jurisdiction as simply a defendant's
concern. It ignored the fact that the adoption code acts as a plaintiff, forcing putative fathers
into a defense posture. It also ignored the ex parte proceedings in which Mr. Osborne was
indeed a defendant. Thus, its entire analysis collapses as the slender reed inevitably breaks.
D. Mr. Osborne Did Not Waive His Personal Jurisdiction Defense by Challenging
Utah's Subject Matter Jurisdiction, and Has Not Been Afforded a Meaningful Opportunity
to Raise a Personal Jurisdiction Defense.
The agency's arguments below require more attention than the reasoning of the Court
of Appeals, whose treatment of the matter is so cursory so as to merit no further analysis.
The agency has argued that Mr. Osborne has the required contacts with and availment of
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Utah law to justify Utah's jurisdiction over him (and, a fortiori, application of Utah law to
him). It claims that when he filed a petition under the UCCJEA to challenge Utah's exercise
of subject matter jurisdiction over him, he waived any personal jurisdiction defense.32
The agency's reasoning is fundamentally flawed:
1.

While it is well-established law that a personal jurisdiction defense is inconsistent
with seeking substantive relief, challenging subject matter jurisdiction (that is,
challenging the court's raw power to act) is not a prayer for substantive relief. Rather,
it is a challenge to the court's very authority, not a simple invocation of that authority.

2.

Mr. Osborne reserved in his UCCJEA petition his right to raise in the future a
personal jurisdiction defense. He thus preserved a narrow jurisdictional challenge
within a more broad one.

3.

The UCCJEA action was dismissed without prejudice, and is of no force and effect.
This is because the court refused to allow Mr. Osborne to serve the defendants.
The agency has also cited In re B.B.D.,33 in contending that any appearance in a Utah

court to either directly or collaterally attack an adoption, no matter how narrowly tailored that
appearance may be, is a purposeful availment under International Shoe.
But B.B.D. is distinguishable. B.B.D. dealt with a Washington father who challenged
Utah's jurisdiction over him in an adoption. He also raised a variety of substantive theories.
In making its decision, this Court relied on three previous Utah decisions, along with

32

Mr. Osborne must reemphasize that this appeal is not and cannot be from that
proceeding, since he was prohibited from even serving the defendants therein.
33

984P.2d 967 (Utah 1999).
26

decisions from Illinois, Indiana, and New York. All of these cases dealt with the UCCJA
(whose successor, the UCCJEA, does not even apply to adoptions), and did not take into
account that adoption is both a custody proceeding and a termination proceeding.
The fact that adoption contemplates termination of parental rights distinguishes
adoption cases from garden-variety custody cases, such as those cited by B.B.D. Termination
of parental rights is irrevocable and is an affirmative act of legal violence to a person's
bundle of liberty interests. In Swayne v. LDS Social Services?* the court recognized that the
termination of parental rights effected by the Utah adoption code did not require a plaintiff,
but rather was "self-operative." The code itself acts like a plaintiff, and reaches out and
grabs natural fathers, who are in reality defendants, but have no knowledge of the
proceedings being taken against them. Both the Utah and Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
have mechanisms under rule 12 to allow persons to object to improper extraterritorial
exercise of personal jurisdiction. B.B.D. did not extend those mechanisms to the putative
father. It did not create a method by which a defendant/father may challenge the application
of Utah law to him without waiving the very challenge that he is bringing.
Here, however, Mr. Osborne has not raised any substantive challenge to the
adoption-he has limited himself to jurisdictional challenges only. As such, B.B.D. need not
apply at all. With all due respect to this Court, the Court could have ended its discussion in
B.B.D^by citing the father's reliance on substantive theories in addition to his jurisdictional
ones. But the Court pushed forward, and instead engaged in an analysis of how purposeful

34

670 F. Supp.1537 (D. Utah 1987).
27

availment was the predicate for jurisdiction. In that analysis the Court failed to distinguish
which of the father's myriad arguments constituted a purposeful availment. Surely the
jurisdictional arguments did not constitute an availment-only the substantive arguments
could have done so. But the Court did not make this crucial (and constitutionally necessary)
distinction.

Because of this failure, the Court should now clarify what constitutes a

purposeful availment, and why Mr. Osborne's jurisdictional challenges cannot constitute
purposeful availment. Thus, this Court can easily distinguish B.B.D. as a case in which one
has waived the personal jurisdiction argument by raising substantive issues, without going
to the issue of whether B.B.D. needs to be overruled on constitutional grounds.
Mr. Osborne has argued that he has proceeded in Utah only narrowly, indeed, as
noted, as a "defendant" appearing specially. This argument may be academic, inasmuch as
the same Fourth District Judge overseeing the UCCJEA petition purported to terminate Mr.
Osborne's parental rights in an ex parte proceeding. The adoption agency could have
attempted service on Mr. Osborne in North Carolina with a constable or sheriff, and then he
could have made a proper special appearance under Utah rules. They did not do this, and this
was deliberate. Mr. Osborne was specifically a party defendant to the ex parte action
purporting to terminate his rights.
Under the Court of Appeals' reading of B.B.D., the only remaining option available
to Mr. Osborne would be to raise his constitutional objections to the Utah courts' exercise
of personal jurisdiction over him in a collateral attack on the adoption. However, if Mr.
Osborne were to petition for this, he would waive any argument that the Utah courts lack
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personal jurisdiction over him. This is a classic Catch-22, and it is not constitutional. Absent
other contacts, exercise of jurisdiction over a natural father in this manner is simply
unconstitutional.35
E. Criticism and Fracture in the Arena of Personal Jurisdiction in Termination
Proceedings: Above the Fog, May v. Anderson is Still Good Law
Realizing the inherent weakness of trying to attribute some kind of minimum contacts
to Mr. Osborne with the State of Utah, the agency has argued that one can escape the
reasoning of May and the minimum contacts/fairness test, by treating the presence of the
child in a jurisdiction as a predicate for "status" jurisdiction. This position echoes that of
a number of scholars and promulgators of uniform acts governing custody and both
Restatements of Conflicts. They advocate that notwithstanding International Shoe and its
progeny, a state retains the ability to adjudicate the status of individuals residing in it,
including the status of children placed for adoption (and also those concerned with the child's
welfare, including natural fathers). This is a conceptually tidy concept were it not that often
such status adjudications have adverse impacts on others whose rights are of constitutional
magnititude. Ultimately, the status exception cannot constitutionally apply to adoptions and
the termination of putative fathers' rights attendant to adoption.
35

Moreover, in a challenge to personal jurisdiction the burden of proof shifts quite
readily to the agency. The agency, as the true "plaintiff in this matter, may take solace
that the allegations in its pleading may be accepted as true, but only to the degree they are
not rebutted by sworn testimony of the "defendant," in this case, Mr. Osborne. American
Land Program, Inc. v. Bonaventura Uitgevers Maatschappi, Inc., 710 F.2d 1449, 1454
(10th Cir. 1983). Mr. Osborne has submitted detailed verified pleadings in the record
specifying his lack of purposeful availment of the Utah forum, and thus the agency has
failed to meet its burden of proof.
on

F.
The Status Doctrine as an Independent Basis for Jurisdiction in
Termination/Adoption
As noted, original concepts ofjurisdiction articulated in Pennoyer v. Neff were based
on the raw power of the sovereign state to exercise control of those within its border. This
notion of "territoriality" was not entirely disposed of with the advent of International Shoe.
In one of its progeny, Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186 (1977), the Court declared that the
International Shoe standard should apply to the assertion of all forms of jurisdiction, thus
dispensing with the Pennoyer "artificial" categories of in rem and quasi in rem jurisdiction.
The Court dropped a footnote to this whitewashing, however, stating, "We do not suggest
that jurisdictional doctrines other than those discussed in text, such as the particularized rules
governing adjudications of status, are inconsistent with the standard of fairness. See, e.g.,
[Roger J. Traynor, Is This Conflict Really Necessary?, 37 Texas L. Rev. 657, 660661(1959)]."36
From this footnote has arisen much mischief. A variety of commentators, most
notably Brigitte Bodenheimer (one of the principal drafters of the Uniform Child Custody
Jurisdiction Act (UCCJA)), have argued that this footnote allows states to adjudicate the
"status" of children within its borders in custody, adoption, and termination proceedings.37

36

Such status determinations are typified by divorce proceedings, in which no
personal jurisdiction is required over a defendant spouse to terminate a marriage. As
discussed below, it is an impermissible stretch to extend the status doctrine from divorce
(which impacts no fundamental liberty interest whatsoever) to the termination of parental
rights proceedings that are part of an adoption.
37

See, e.g., Brigitte M. Bodenheimer, The Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act:
A legislative Remedy for Children Caught in the Conflict of Laws, 22 Vand. L. Rev. 1207
(1969); Brigitte Bodenheimer & Janet Neeley-Kvarme, Jurisdiction over Child Custody
on

A variety of reasons are forwarded for this conclusion, the most forceful of which is
pragmatic: requiring personal jurisdiction over putative fathers would unhinge many
adoptions, and in other custody proceedings would eviscerate the UCCJA and its successor,
the UCCJEA.
How do these arguments skirt May? Bodenheimer, in her original article on child
custody jurisdiction, argued that a child's residence in the forum was a significant contact
with the defendant parent that established jurisdiction over the defendant parent. Kulko
eliminated this rationale. In response, and in casting for another way around pesky May,
Bodenheimer and Janet Neeley-Kvarme pointed to Frankfurter's opinion in May and the
Restatement's adoption of that opinion as dispositive. They reasoned that jurisdiction over
the defendant parent in a custody case was an issue of comity. Under Frankfurter's
concurrence in May, states are free to recognize sister state judgments.

In enacting the

Uniform Act, they argue, the states decided to recognize orders that complied with the Act,
resolving the comity issue.
G. Why the Status Doctrine Cannot be Reconciled with Applicable Law
Notwithstanding the academic criticism of

May and the fact that both the

UCCJA/UCCJEA and Restatement of Conflicts have chosen to ignore it, scholars and cases
are not unified in its criticism. A number of cases have required traditional personal
jurisdiction over parents in termination and custody proceedings (including a Utah case),38

and Shaffer and Kulko, 12 U.C. Davis L. Rev. 229 (1979).
}S

See, e.g., DeMent v. Oglala Sioux Tribal Court, 874 F.2d 510 (8th Cir. 1989);
Application of Defender, 435 N.W.2d 717, 720-21 (S.D. 1989); see also In re W.A., 2002
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and commentators are balkanized in their view of May and its effects.
An incisive critical analysis of May and of the status exception in custody and
termination proceedings is that of Rhonda Wasserman. She states six defective rationales
for why the status or physical presence doctrines are invoked as jurisdictional predicates:
1. The State Sovereignty Rationale. This rationale purports to defer to a state's right
to adjudicate the rights of those within it, but is problematic because "custody proceedings
often interfere with the sovereignty of other states, which have like interests in the same
children."39 Furthermore, "the Supreme Court has made clear that constitutional limits on
personal jurisdiction are designed to protect individuals' liberty interests, not to preserve state
sovereignty and interstate federalism."40 Wasserman also notes that neither Shaffer nor Kulko
vested the states therein with jurisdiction notwithstanding the presence of property or a child

UT 72 \ 25 (App. 2002)("Recognizing the fundamental liberty interest at stake in a
proceedings involving the termination of parental rights, other jurisdictions have held that
a state must meet its Fourteenth Amendment obligation to obtain personal jurisdiction
over a parent prior to attempting to terminate his or her parental rights. See In re One
Minor Child, 411 A.2d 951, 952-53 (Del. 1980) (holding no jurisdiction over appellant
because of insufficient notice); In re R.G., 611 So. 2d 71 (Fla. Ct. App. 1992) (per
curiam); In re Doe, 83 Haw. 367, 926 P.2d 1290 (Haw. 1996); Phillips v. Thornerfelt,
Nos. 85-CA-1075-S, 85- CA-1372-S, 1986 Ky. App. LEXIS 1116 (Ky. Ct. App. April 25,
1986); see also In re Vernon R., 1999 NMCA 125, 991 P.2d 986, 128 N.M. 242 (N.M. Ct.
App. 1999) (holding that a "status" exception was inapplicable to the specific facts of the
case, but leaving open the question when a child's best interest is clearly at issue)."
39

Rhonda Wasserman, Parents, Partners, and PersonalJurisdiction, 1995 U. 111.
L. Rev. 813, 866 (hereinafter "Wasserman").
40

Id. at 869, citing Insurance Corp. oflr. v. Compagnie des Bauxites de Guineef
456 U.S. 694, 702 (1982); see also Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 472
n.l3(1985).
io

in those states.41
2. The Theoretical Rationale. This rationale states that child custody litigation is in
rem, and therefore no personal jurisdiction is required. Shaffer seriously undermines this
rationale, having dispensed with the traditional labels of in rem, quasi-in-rem, or in personam
jurisdiction.42 This is especially true in the child custody context, where fundamental liberty
interests are at stake.
3. The Doctrinal Rationale. This doctrine relies on footnote 30 Shaffer and the limited
reading of May advocated by Bodenheimer. As for footnote 30, Wasserman notes that
the Court most likely did not intend to include child custody adjudications
within its blanket reference to "adjudications of status . . . ." The majority
opinion offers divorce as the sole example of a status adjudication. It cites
only Justice Traynor's article, Is This Conflict Really Necessary ? [37 Tex. L.
Rev. 657, 660-61 (1959)] for the proposition that the particularized
jurisdictional rules governing adjudications of status may conform to standards
of fairness. On the pages cited by the Court, Justice Traynor's article purports
to justify the status exception for divorce while distinguishing cases affecting
the parent-child relationship: "There is an element of contract and some
equality of parties in the marital relationship. These are lacking in the parentchild relationship, and the interest of the state therefore becomes
correspondingly larger in any action involving parent and child. Contracts [sic]
of both parties with the state also take on larger and perhaps paramount
importance, since the consequences of any action either declaring or
terminating the relationship are so momentous to the parties. In conjunction
with fair play, these considerations would normally preclude jurisdiction over
a nonresident defendant having no contact with the forum state" [Traynor at
661 (emphasis added.] In light of the Court's reference to divorce as the
paradigmatic status case, its citation to Justice Traynor's article distinguishing
divorce and parent-child cases, and Traynorfs acknowledgment that the latter

4]

Id. at 869-70.

42

Id. at 871-72. Wasserman argues that footnote 30 of Shaffer does not include
child custody determinations in her discussion of the Doctrinal Rationale, discussed
below.
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typically require minimum contacts, it is highly unlikely that the Shaffer Court
intended to include child custody cases within whatever exception footnote
30 preserved.43
In discussing May, she acknowledges that
[ajdvocates of the status exception rely heavily on Justice Frankfurters
concurring opinion for the proposition that May did not decide that the
Wisconsin decree violated the Due Process Clause. Because Frankfurter's vote
was necessary to reverse the judgment below, his view of what the Court
decided has been widely accepted.
It is difficult to accept Frankfurter's
argument that the majority's opinion was grounded exclusively in the Full Faith
and Credit Clause, and not in due process. After all, Justice Burton framed the
issue in terms of Wisconsin's authority to terminate Leona's custody rights
without acquiring jurisdiction over her. This is an issue of due process.
Likewise, Burton concluded that "a mother's right to custody of her children
is a personal right entitled to at least as much protection as her right to
alimony"— that is, due process protection. Additionally, Burton cited three
state cases for the proposition that custody decrees rendered without personal
service on or the appearance of the nonresident parent are void. Thus, the
most plausible reading of the majority opinion is that a custody decree entered
without in personam jurisdiction over one of the contestants violates due
process and is not entitled to interstate enforcement. Granted, Justice
Frankfurter interpreted what the majority held differently and so stated in his
separate concurrence. But instead of concurring only in the judgment,
Frankfurter joined Justice Burton's opinion, adding the fifth vote, and making
the majority opinion the law of the land.
The Court has not overruled May; indeed, in the years since 1953,
Supreme Court Justices have cited May in eighteen opinions. [44] Most of the
citations have been for the uncontroversial propositions that the private realm

43

Id. at 872-73 (footnotes omitted). Cf Christopher L. Blakesley, Comparativist
Ruminations from the Bayou on Child Custody Jurisdiction: the UCCJA, the PKPA, and
the Hague Convention on Child Abduction, 58 La. L. Rev. 449, 508 (1998). (ff[R]eading
Shaffer to except child custody matters from the requirement of some form of in
personam jurisdiction or other substantive due process fairness is not within Shaffer's
holding and is inconsistent with constitutional law and policy relating to both child
protection and parental authority and interests.").
44

Most notably, in Stanley the Court cited May for the nonjurisdictional proposition
that the right to have and raise a family is "more precious than property right,"405 U.S.
645, 651 (1972), and again with approval in Kulko, 436 U.S. 84, 97 (1978).
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of family life is protected from governmental intrusion or that parents have a
significant interest in the companionship and care of their children or that
children have a special place in life, which the law should reflect, or that child
custody cases involve different interests than cases involving alimony or the
termination of parental rights. But while the Court has not clearly reaffirmed
May's holding, it has not disavowed it either. May is still good law. Because
May holds that due process requires a state court to acquire in personam
jurisdiction over parents before adjudicating custody, May seriously
undermines, rather than supports, the status exception for child custody.45
4. The Expediency Rationale. This rationale relies on the state's right to place a child
within its borders with a suitable parent, and that the state can enforce that decree irrespective
of whether personal jurisdiction lies against a parent. Wasserman argues that not only does
this rationale violate the federalist notion that states should cooperate in the enforcement of
decrees, it actually supports the requirement of personal jurisdiction, since custody decrees
require interstate cooperation to be fully effective. Not least important is the fact that
jurisdictional limits exist not to ensure easy enforcement of judgments, but
rather to protect litigants from the inconvenience occasioned by suit in a
distant forum. Thus, even if courts with power over the children could ensure
enforcement of their custody decrees, and even if in personam jurisdiction
over the parents made enforcement no easier, the Constitution would protect
the defending parents from litigation in fora in which they would suffer
meaningful inconvenience.46
5. The Futility Rationale. This rationale defers to the notion that requiring jurisdiction over
the parents in a custody determination does not guarantee that the parents will appear in
court. This "Why bother?" doctrine fails because
[j]urisdictional limits are designed to afford defendants a reasonable
opportunity to appear in a convenient forum, not to assure their appearance..

45

Id. at 877-78 (citations omitted).

46

Id. at 879-80 (citations omitted).
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. . . Indeed, requiring states to acquire in personam jurisdiction over all
contestants in custody proceedings actually would help procure the attendance
of the parties because once a court acquires jurisdiction over a person, it can
compel her attendance at trial via a subpoena.47
6. The Benevolent Rationale. This rationale applies in rare but hard cases where minium
contacts analysis would make adjudication of custody impossible, such as in the case of a
foreign parent. This rationale spawned much of the confusion and indeterminacy of custody
decrees before enactment of the UCCJA: states would exert jurisdiction willy-nilly in an
atmosphere of uncertainty that promoted child snatching (which is what is happening to Mr.
Osborne). "Thus," notes Wasserman, "although most of us would agree that the child's
interests are paramount, great care and prudence are required in determining the actions and
procedures that actually promote these interests."48
Her solution to the problem facing this Court with Mr. Osborne is quite simple: Even
if the child's home state (here, arguendo, Utah) lacks personal jurisdiction over all of the
contestants, as long as some state can acquire such jurisdiction, the availability of "residual
jurisdiction" should resolve the issue of subject matter jurisdiction.49 Here, North Carolina
fits the bill. It has jurisdiction over the adoptive parents inasmuch as they affirmatively
sought adoption of a North Carolina child, and, were the father's jurisdictional rights
recognized, would be compelled to initiate adoption proceedings in North Carolina. They
certainly have sufficient contact with Kenneth's home state by attempting to wrest custody

41

Id. at 881-82 (citations omitted).

*Hd at 890.
"Id. at 889-90.
if*

of North Carolina child to be amenable to jurisdiction there.

(Indeed, if the UCCJEA

applied to adoptions, Mr. Osborne's UCCJEA petition would have effected this very result).
Wasserman further argues that
[e]ven if this interpretation of the UCCJA is not accepted, however, arguing
that the Constitution should succumb to a statute invites the tail to wag the
dog. If personal jurisdiction over the contestants is a constitutional
requirement, and if the statute that authorizes courts to exercise subject matter
jurisdiction in child custody cases fails to acknowledge that requirement, the
problem is a poor fit between the Constitution and the statute. In such cases,
the statute must be amended. It cannot be, as the benevolent rationale appears
to argue, that the Constitution must be ignored.50
Wasserman's basic point is that the UCCJA and Restatement of Conflicts ignore
jurisdictional requirements under the Constitution.51 In other words, the emperor has no
clothes. Her conclusion is shared, in varying degrees, by others.52

50

Id. at 887.

51

Cf. Barbara Ann Atwood, Child Custody Jurisdiction and Territoriality, 52 Ohio
St. L.J. 369, 394 (1991)("The 'problem' of May v. Anderson was almost buried by the
drafters of the UCCJA. The Commissioners1 explicit reliance on the status exception to
personal jurisdiction has a convenient appeal, but the status exception, upon examination,
does not seem to support the judicial authority necessary for determinations of custody.").
Atwood's approach rejects status in favor of a territory-based jurisdiction echoing the
1990 case of Burnham v. Superior Court, 495 U.S. 604 (1990), in which the Supreme
Court approved transitory jurisdiction. Her theory that the child is the territorial predicate
for jurisdiction under Burnham is misplaced in cases of wrongful transfers or abductions,
especially when the result is termination, not mere modification of a custody order. Such
abduction with terminal consequences certainly does not satisfy the fairness component of
which Justice Scalia speaks in Burnham's majority opinion, and which the other justices
considered more forcefully in that case (echoing, logically, the fairness requirements of
International Shoe and its progeny).
51

See, e.g. Russell M. Coombs, Interstate Child Custody: Jurisdiction, Recognition,
and Enforcement, 66 Minn. L. Rev. 711 (1982); Ann Bradford Stevens, Is Failure to
Support a Minor Child in the State Sufficient Contact with that State to Justify In
Personam Jurisdiction?, 17 S. 111. U. L. J. 491, 501-03 (1993)(agreeing with Wasserman's
37

H. Personal Jurisdiction and the Putative Father in Adoption: The Natural Father's
Constitutional Protections Accord with Extending Him the Protections of the Minimum
Contacts/Reasonableness Standard
The calls for child-based jurisdiction raised by Bodenheimer, even if accepted in the
face of the criticism cited above, should be limited to custody determinations, where the
parental right of the absent parent are being modified, not terminated. Termination is not
modification, and stricter due process requirements attach to termination than modification.
Two cases define the standards governing termination of parental rights. In Lassiter
v. Department of Social Services51 the Court determined that a parent whose child had been
temporarily removed from his or her custody because of neglect nonetheless had a due
process liberty interest in his relationship with the child, such that if indigent, the parent
might have a constitutional right to appointed counsel. Thus, a parent whose ability to care
for the child has already been thrown into doubt nonetheless has a constitutional interest in
the child. Likewise, in Santosky v. Kramer54 the Court held that a "natural parent's" liberty
interest in his or her relationship with the child mandated that the state show "permanent
neglect" by clear and convincing evidence before it may terminate the parent's parental rights.
Custody adjudications do not terminate parental rights. Because they are not afforded

reading of May); Herma Hill Kay, Adoption in the Conflict of Laws: The UAA, Not the
UCCJA, Is the Answer, 84 Calif. L. Rev. 703, 731-741 (1996).
Given the reasoning of these commentators and the cases cited therein, it strains
credulity when the State of Utah argues in its In re W.A. brief that ".. . . there is no reason
to believe the United States Supreme Court would not apply the status exception to
terminations and other child custody determinations." Brief in Chief at 26.
53

452U.S. 18(1981)

54

455 U.S. 745 (1982)
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the same constitutional strictures afforded termination proceedings, it is easier to argue away
personal jurisdiction in favor of status or territory based notions in custody matters, as
opposed to the irreversible (and constitutionally sensitive) termination of parental rights.
Because adoption entails termination of parental rights, putative fathers are potentially
entitled to the same protections afforded any father in an adoption proceeding. "Potentially"
because not all fathers can show Lehr fatherhood, but there are those, like Mr. Osborne, that
may be able to do so.

If a father can show Lehr fatherhood, he is, for all intents and

purposes, entitled to the same due process protections afforded by the Supreme Court,
protections grounded in the father's liberty interest in being a father.55 Those protections are
derived from the "biological rights" of a father to raise his child, since a natural parent is
generally regarded as best suited to raise his or her child.56

55

See, e.g., Nale v. Robertson, 871 S.W.2d 674 (Tenn. 1994)(adoptions cannot go
forward until parental rights are terminated under applicable Tennessee law).
56

Toni L. Craig , Establishing the Biological Rights Doctrine to Protect Unwed
Fathers in Contested Adoptions, 25 Fla. St. U.L. Rev. 391, 403-405 (1998) ("When an
unwed father contests the at-birth adoption of his child, the federal Constitution requires
application of the biological rights doctrine. This conclusion follows from analysis of
United States Supreme Court cases that have held the Fourteenth Amendment protects
parents' significant interests in a relationship with their children, third parties have no
liberty interest in a relationship with a child not biologically connected to them, and that
the "best interests of the child'1 is not a proper standard to determine whether to terminate
a biological parent's rights. Cases involving contested at-birth adoptions are analogous to
[Stanley, in which] the only countervailing state interest was the state's desire to protect
the welfare of children. As the Stanley Court opined, the state's interest would be served,
rather than hampered, by awarding a fit, unwed biological father custody of his children.
Thus, the federal Constitution requires adherence to the biological rights doctrine in
contested at-birth adoption cases because the unwed father has a fundamental right in his
parental relationship, and the state has no substantial interest that would justify burdening
that right. . . . In addition to being required by the Federal Constitution, the biological
rights doctrine serves certain state social, economic, and administrative interests. First,
39

As has been suggested, there are putative fathers and putative fathers. Many do not
rise to Lehr fatherhood, and therefore have no rights under Lehr. Others have perfected their
rights. Most compelling is the case of the "faultless father," that is, the putative father who
tries to develop a relationship with his child but is thwarted in doing so.57 The rights of such
fathers should not be derived exclusively from assessing the best interest of the child ("Don't
take away my daddy"), but rather from his lost opportunity to develop a relationship with his
child ("Don't take away my child"). 58 State courts have taken their cue from the Supreme

the biological rights doctrine prevents the state from social engineering, which is inherent
in making a "best interests" judgment.. . . Second, the biological rights doctrine confirms
that the rights of biological parents are firmly rooted in natural law, religion, and social
dictates. . . . Third, presuming that a biological parent is fit brings adoption contests to
finality by simplifying termination proceedings. . . . Fourth, the biological rights doctrine
encourages individual responsibility by allowing the birth father to assume the burden of
caring for, nurturing, and supporting his child. . .. Finally, the biological rights doctrine
places the father on a more level playing field with the mother. ")
57

"[T]he Court's cases seem to contemplate only two models of fatherhood: the
man of virtue who is integrally involved in the rearing of his children and the scofflaw
who has slept on his rights while others changed diapers and read bedtime stories. The
Court's cases do not squarely resolve what should be done with the father who falls
somewhere in between these two poles—for example, the man who has done everything
he reasonably could to establish a relationship with his child but who has been thwarted
by circumstances beyond his control." David D. Meyer, Family Ties: Solving the
Constitutional Dilemma of the Faultless Father, 41 Ariz. L. Rev. 753, 763
(1999)(hereinafter "Meyer"). The "thwarted father" is yet another name for the faultless
father. See Kristin Morgan-Tracy, The Right of the Thwarted Father to Veto the Adoption
of His Child, 62 U. Cinn. L. Rev. 1695 (1994)(citing with approval Swayne v. L.D.S. Soc.
Servs., 795 P.2d 637 (Utah 1990)).
58

"[I]f the Constitution afforded no protection at all to purely potential
relationships, that provided a short and complete answer to Lehr's constitutional challenge
to the adoption of his daughter; instead, the Lehr Court felt compelled to reject Lehr's
claim on the narrower ground that New York's Putative Father Registry gave him a
constitutionally sufficient opportunity to 'grasp' his opportunity at parenthood." Meyer at
766. Meyer argues further that the rationale behind Santosky, which requires that
40

Court in repeatedly siding with the father-based rights inquiry.59
This Court has taken the vanguard in forwarding this argument. InEllis v. LDS Social
Services this Court noted the possible existence of faultless fathers, stating,
In the usual case, the putative father would either know or reasonably should
know approximately when and where his child was born. It is conceivable,
however, that a situation may arise when it is impossible for the father to file
the required notice of paternity prior to the statutory bar, through no fault of
his own. In such a case, due process requires that he be afforded a reasonable
opportunity to comply with the statute.60
Subsequent cases emanating from this Court demonstrate its sensitivity to the plight of the
faultless father, a sensitivity acknowledged by, and not abrogated by, the current adoption
code.61 If the revisions to that code mandated by this Court, either expressly or impliedly,

termination of parental rights be predicated on unfitness (which in turn must be proved by
clear and convincing evidence) underscores the requirement that some fault be attributed
to the father whose rights are being terminated. Meyer at 783-85.
59

"In both [the Baby Richard and Baby Jessica] cases, the state supreme courts
regarded the fathers as blameless victims of the machinations of others and held, in effect,
that the Constitution would not permit these men to suffer the loss of fatherhood when
they had done nothing to warrant such a grievous penalty." Id. Cf. In re J. P., 648 P.2d
1364, 1368-69 (Utah 1982; (holding that the welfare of the child may not be considered
without prior determination that the parent is unfit). See also In re M.N.M., 605 A.2d
921, 928-29 (D.C.), cert, denied, 113 S. Ct. 636 (1992)("Because the child, without [the
father's] knowledge, was placed in the custody of the adoption agency almost from the
moment of birth, [the father] had no opportunity to develop a relationship with his
offspring,... which he can be said to have abandoned by his subsequent conduct.... We
hold that appellant sufficiently asserted his parental interest and therefore may claim
"substantial protection under the Due Process Clause.") (quoting Lehr v. Robertson, 463
U.S. 248, 262, 261 (1983)).
60

615 P.2d 1250, 1256 (Utah 1980).

61

This Court has repeatedly considered fault material in assessing a putative
father's rights. See, e.g., Swayne v. L.D.S. Soc. Servs., 795 P.2d 637, 642-43 (Utah 1990)
(timely registration not reasonably impossible when mother and father both Utah
A\

fail to remedy injustices wrought upon the faultless father, this Court's reasoning and
philosophy in Ellis and its progeny still control.
Faultless fathers suffer insult over injury if a state asserts jurisdiction over them
without minimum contacts or reasonableness.

If "no-fault1' termination is a suspect

enterprise under Utah's reading of the Constitution, it becomes palpably infirm when
colliding with the notions of fair play and substantial justice necessary for the exercise of
personal jurisdiction. Faultless fathers should not be dragged into foreign courts simply to
establish their status as such. In this respect a faultless father's due process rights as a parent
(protected by Santosky and Lassiter) tie directly into his due process right to defend against
termination of his parentage in a foreign jurisdiction. One would then wonder, at the risk that
a father may truly be faultless, why any court would ever attempt to assert jurisdiction based

residents, father maintained contact with mother and child, and father knew that mother
was considering relinquishing the child for adoption); Wells v. Children's Aid Soc'y of
Utah, 681 P.2d 199, 207-08 (Utah 1984)(timely registration not reasonably impossible
where ffbirth occurred in the same state as the father's residence," father had "ample
advance notice of the expected time of birth and the fact that the mother intended to
relinquish the child for adoption," and "neither the child's mother nor the adoption agency
was involved in any effort to prevent him from learning of the birth or from asserting his
parental rights"); Sanchez v. L.D.S. Social Servs., 680 P.2d 753 (Utah 1984)(timely
registration not reasonably impossible where father resided in Utah, maintained contact
with mother throughout pregnancy, and knew of her plans to relinquish child for
adoption); In re Adoption of Baby Boy Doe, 111 P.2d 686, 690-91 (Utah 1986)(timely
registration was not reasonably possible, and therefore constitutionally must be excused,
where mother knew of out-of-state father's objections to adoption and misrepresented that
she would not relinquish child); Adoption ofW., 904 P.2d 1113,1120-21 (Utah Ct. App.
1995)(per curiam)(mother's undisclosed move from Indiana to Nevada for delivery of
child and surrender of child for adoption in Utah reasonably excused father's initial failure
to register paternity claim in Utah, but did not excuse his failure to register for eight
months after learning of the Utah adoption proceeding). These citations paraphrase
Professor Meyer's citation of the same cases at note 174.
Al

on a bald assumption that the father cannot show Lehr fatherhood.62
I. Mr. Osborne Could Prevail Under Either Utah or North Carolina Under the Facts
of This Case.
Whether Mr. Osborne is a "faultless father" may be a matter of dispute, the agency
agreeing with the Court of Appeals that the mother's single isolated contact with Utah
disqualify him from invoking Utah's foreign father exception63 and therefore subjects him
to the foil requirements of Utah law.

Because Mr. Osborne's argument is purely

jurisdictional, those issues are not in play in this appeal.

64

Nevertheless, this Court, in

assessing the "fairness" aspect of the jurisdictional inquiry, should consider that the agency's
argument is ephemeral. The mother's unlawfully coming to Utah to have the child, then
changing her mind and returning to live in Mr. Osborne's home for five months, and then
equivocating again and coming back to Utah, did not require Mr. Osborne to assume she
could return to Utah at any time during this period.65
More compelling still is that under North Carolina law Mr. Osborne's consent is

62

Ironically, this is exactly what Judge Hansen did when he ex parte purported to
terminate Mr. Osborne's rights, taking the risk that Mr. Osborne is indeed a faultless
father.
63

Utah Code Annot. § 78-30-4.15 (Supp. 2001).

64

Mr. Osborne folly intends to raise section 78-30-4.15 if his jurisdictional
challenge is denied, along with the fact that the six-month period in section 78-30-4.14 (in
which a father is presumed to not have any Lehr relationship whatsoever outside of the
statutory criteria) is unconstitutional as applied to him, a father who had an actual and
supportive relationship with a child up to five months after birth.
65

There is no dispute that Mr. Osborne did not know of Kenneth's second trip to
Utah until after relinquishment.
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required to Kenneth's adoption because he held Kenneth out as his son for five months and
cared for Kenneth in his home.66 This makes him truly faultless.
J. The Adoption Code Fails to Provide for Procedural Due Process, Nor Was any
Procedural Due Process Afforded Mr. Osborne
The State of Utah argued in its brief in In re W.A., No. 20020236-SC, currently
pending before this court on certiorari, that even if traditional personal jurisdiction was not
required over a father in termination proceeding, he still had the protection of procedural due
process by being notified and given the opportunity for a hearing. Brief in Chief at 23, 3537. That is not the case under the Utah Adoption Code. No putative father, faultless or no,
is extended such protections. As such, what the State argues is a saving catch for the
Termination of Parental Rights Act is no save at all for the Adoption Code.67
Where practicable (and in Mr. Osborne's case, the fact that Kenneth lived in Mr.
Osborne's home and was held out as his child meant that it would have been very
practicable), putative fathers should be extended the same procedural due process protections
guaranteed by the termination act. Giving notice early in the proceedings guarantees a
"clean" adoption, eliminating the possibility of future collateral attack and the Hobson's

66

N.C.C.A. §§ 48-2-401, -404; N.C.C.A. § 48-3-601 (2)(b)(5).

67

Apart from the more substantial procedural protections and higher burden of
proof contained in the Termination of Parental Rights Act, Utah Code Ann. §§ 78-3a-401
through -414 (1996 & Supp. 2001), as contrasted with the Utah Adoption Code, Utah
Code Ann. §§ 78-30-1 through -19 (Supp. 2001), the facts in In re W.A. differ
substantially from those here, especially with respect to the father's contacts with the Stat
of Utah (the child there had received substantial benefits from Utah since 1996). Thus,
the fairness and minimum contacts analysis in In re W.A. is so dissimilar so as to be
inapplicable to Mr. Osborne's case.
AA

choice between a "high-risk" adoption and no adoption at all.68
Responsible practitioners in this area give notice at the outset to prevent such results,
but this is not always the norm. The rampant and reprehensible pattern of "duck and cover"
adoptions in the State of Utah, often of foreign children by foreign adoptive parents, is the
result of failing to afford procedural due process guarantees.69 Indeed, Mr. Osborne has been

68

Cf Joan H. Hollinger, Adoption Procedure, in 1 ADOPTION LAW AND
PRACTICE (Joan H. Hollinger ed., 2002)(attitude toward adoptions may be
characterized in three ways: (1) increased reluctance to force a mother to divulge
information about a putative father and more systematic efforts to set limits for seeking
information about the father from other sources; (2) increased wariness about granting
parental rights to putative fathers who have not come forward of their own volition; and
(3) increased recognition of the risks to the child posed by delays in resolving the father's
status; and as a consequence, fewer placements of a child in the limbo of foster care, and
more placements on an "at risk" basis with the prospective adoptive parents.); Putative
Fathers' Rights: Striking the Right Balance in Adoption Laws, 20 Wm. Mitchell L. Rev.
930 (1994); Katherine L. Corley, Removing the Bar Sinister: Adoption Rights of Putative
Fathers, 15 Cumb. L. Rev. 499, 516 (1984-85)(stating that statutes that do not sufficiently
protect the putative father furnish him, even if he has no sincere interest in the child, with
a means to "complicate, impede, and perhaps even prevent the adoption").
The necessity of notice is beyond argument. Apart from the state's refuge behind
notice in its arguments in In re W.A., No. 20020236-SC (Appellant's Brief in Chief at 23,
35), commentators have advocated notice to putative fathers as a requirement in adoption
statutes to protect the father's constitutional rights and, derivatively, to insulate adoptions
from collateral attack. Elizabeth A. Hadad , Tradition and the Liberty Interest:
Circumscribing the Rights of the Natural Father: Michael H. v. Gerald D., 56 Brooklyn
L. Rev. 291 (1990). Indeed, one commentator even argues that putative fathers have a
constitutional right to know that their child exists. John R. Hamilton, The Unwed Father
and the Right to Know of His Child's Existence, 76 Ky. L.J. 949 (1988).
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Such cases do occur. For example, in a recent case pending before the Fourth
Judicial District Court, Utah County, Vazquez v. Adoption Center of Choice, No.
002400156, the Court issued a preliminary injunction blasting the defendant agency's
having secured post hoc permission for service by publication and other lackluster
attempts to notify the Alabama father of a seven-month-old child. The opinion is attached
as Exhibit 42. Notable about the case is that the child was from Alabama and the
adoptive parents were from yet a different state than Utah. This prompts the question,
Why is Utah even involved? Forum shopping is the answer, inasmuch as Utah's
A^

subject to two instances where he was denied procedural due process guarantees. The first
was when the adoption was initiated (to this day, he does not know in which court it is
pending). The second is when the Fourth District Judicial Court purported to terminate his
rights ex parte as a result of a motion filed against him ex parte. The first violation was
clearly unconstitutional. The second was not only that: it was so unbelievable that it appears
to be fictional. Upon realizing its reality, one can only call it ghastly.
Without procedural due process protections, exercising jurisdiction over nonresident
putative fathers without an independent basis for such jurisdiction lacks any saving grace.
It is simply unconstitutional.
K. Notions of Comity to North Carolina Disfavor Jurisdiction
Arguments in favor of the nationalization of jurisdiction under the UCCJEA rely
heavily on comity as the basis for rejecting May. Apart from the conceptual problems posed
by this somewhat artificial approach (discussed above), there is a more immediate, practical
problem: North Carolina is hopping mad about Kenneth's adoption. A North Carolina court
has enjoined the adoption, and the North Carolina Department of Social Services has also
objected, stating that Kenneth has received benefits in North Carolina and that this adoption

Adoption Code is one of the most hostile to putative fathers in the nation. "The lack of
uniformity in state law leads to considerable pressure to engage in forum shopping.
Results achievable under the laws of one state may not be possible in another. Efforts to
tighten regulations in some states have been undermined by laws and practices in other
states that are less attentive to the ethical and chil-protective aspects of adoption
practice.,f Joan H. Hollinger, Adoption Procedure, in 1 ADOPTION LAW AND
PRACTICE 4-9 (Hollinger ed., 2002). The Vazquez case is brought to the Court's
attention not for any precedential effect, but for the sole reason that such cases are not
mere hypothetical fantasy or academic ruminations.
A6

should have been subject to Interstate Compact supervision.70
It thus makes little sense on these facts to adopt a jurisdictional construct based on
comity when there is no comity whatsoever. North Carolina views Utah as somewhat of a
bully in this matter. The comity rationale is thus not only inapplicable; it is nonsensical.
II. EXERCISING JURISDICTION OVER MR. OSBORNE VIOLATES THE UTAH
CONSTITUTION
Exercising jurisdiction over Mr. Osborne violates the Utah Constitution in three
respects: it violates due process under Article I, section 7 (due process), Article I, section 11
(open courts), and Article I, section 24 (uniform application of laws).
The article 7 violations are essentially similar to the due process violations of the
Fourteenth Amendment:
1.
2.
3.

Utah cannot exercise personal jurisdiction without a showing of minimum
contacts and fairness.
Utah cannot deprive Mr. Osborne of his parental rights without notice (a
violation of procedural due process).
Mr. Osborne cannot be deemed to have waived his due process objections to
jurisdiction simply bu his appearing in Utah courts to challenge jurisdiction,
and jurisdiction only.

The section 11 arguments are different substantively than any federal violation.
Section 11 provides:
All courts shall be open, and every person, for an injury done to him in his
person, property, or reputation, shall have remedy by due course of law, which
shall be administered without denial or unnecessary delay; and no person shall
be barred from prosecuting or defending before any tribunal in this state, by
himself or counsel any civil cause to which he is a party.
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The Compact requires each state's administrator to review the placement to
ensure that state law has been met. Utah Code Annot. § 62A-4a-701 (2002). In this case,
North Carolina law was not met because Mr. Osborne's consent was required.
47

In assessing a claim under this article, this Court has stated that
a statutory classification that discriminates against a person's constitutionally
protected right to a remedy for personal injury under Article I, section 11 is
constitutional only if it (1) is reasonable, (2) has more than a speculative
tendency to further the legislative objective and, in fact, actually and
substantially furthers a valid legislative purpose, and (3) is reasonably
necessary to further a legitimate legislative goal.71
The legislature's attempt to exercise authority over foreign fathers without their
having requisite contacts with Utah satisfies none of these criteria. Moreover, a reading of
In re B.B.D. creating a self-executing waiver of a jurisdictional defense means that there is
no forum in which such a defense may be raised. This is a violation of section 11. There is
no legitimate legislative purpose in forcing foreign putative fathers to submit to Utah
jurisdiction and law.
The same is true under Article I, section 24. It provides
"All laws of a general nature shall have uniform operation." Although this
provision is sometimes thought to have the same effect and impose the same
legal standards on legislative action as the equal protection guarantee found in
the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution, the language and
history of the two provisions are entirely different, and even though there are
important areas of overlap in the concepts embodied in the two provisions, the
differences can produce different legal consequences. . . .
For a law to be constitutional under Article I, section 24, it is not
enough that it be uniform on its face. What is critical is that the operation of
the law be uniform. A law does not operate uniformly if "persons similarly
situated" are not "treated similarly" or if "persons in different circumstances"
are "treated as if their circumstances were the same." Malan v. Lewis, 693
P.2d 661, 669 (Utah 1984).72
Under section 24, nonresident putative fathers are treated differently than Utah
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Lee v. Gaufin, 867 P.2d 572, 582-83 (Utah 1993).

72

Id. at 577.
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residents. They are forced to appear in Utah to defend their rights, even if those rights are
unquestionable. And, as noted, the savings clause in section 78-30-4.15 is insufficient to
remedy this problem, since even with that clause a nonresident father must still come to Utah
to not only claim his child, but to prove his rights over that child.
III. THIS COURT'S TASK: TO RULE ON THESE ISSUES NOW, WITHOUT REMAND
This matter is not an appeal from a lower court's ruling, but rather is on certiorari
from the Court of Appeal's denial of an Original Petition. That denial was erroneous both
because the Court of Appeals ruled on issues not raised in Mr. Osborne's Original Petition
(namely, how Utah law applied to him, an irrelevant notion), and dismissed the jurisdictional
issue on an indefensible basis (the birth of Kenneth in Utah).
The Original Petition requested a declaration that Mr. Osborne could raise his
jurisdictional defense in district court without waiving it. He also asked that the court of
adoption be revealed and that the adoption be stayed. Even though Mr. Osborne originally
requested merely a remand with instructions and a safe harbor, the Court of Appeals
preempted that request by stating that Mr. Osborne had no rights whatsoever.
On certiorari this Court faces a case with undisputed facts, and one issue: does Utah
have jurisdiction over Mr. Osborne? Judicial efficiency, combined with the history of this
matter, dictate that this Court should rule on Mr. Osborne's jurisdictional contentions now.
More important, the very rights Mr. Osborne endeavors to defend would be compromised by
the further delay caused by a remand. Finally, and not insignificantly, whatever a lower court
rules, this Court would undoubtedly revisit this issue after proceedings that will not
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meaningfully enhance the record as presently constituted.
CONCLUSION
States are limited by the Constitution in their exercise of jurisdiction over
nonresidents, both out of respect of fairness to the individuals and the sovereignty of the
states. This is true with respect to putative fathers in adoption, given the importance of the
rights at stake. Under this doctrine, Mr. Osborne has rights under the federal and Utah
constitutions. Mr. Osborne's rights have been violated by Utah's exercise of authority over
him and application of its law to him. This Court should dismiss the pending Utah adoption
and cede authority over this matter to the North Carolina courts, which can make appropriate
substantive orders regarding Kenneth's welfare and IN^Osborne's relationship with him.
DATED this j £ L day of October, 2002.

Phillip EJLowfcy, foi
HOWARD, LEWIS & PETERSEN
Attorneys for Appellant
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This case is before the court on a petition for
extraordinary relief. Petitioner seeks relief in the form of:
1) a writ of mandamus against every district court in the state
to prevent the finalization of the adoption scheduled for
sometime after July 4, 2002; 2) an order to compel the adoption
agency to reveal the identity of the adoptive parents; and 3)
an order to allow the petitioner, alleging he is the biological
father, to intervene in the adoption without waiving his
objection to personal jurisdiction.
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[I] n the case of unmarried father, a biological
relationship alone is insufficient to establish
constitutionally protected parental rights." In re Adoption of
B.B.D, 1999 UT 70,1110, 984 P.2d 967 (citing Lehr v. Robertson,
463 U.S. 248, 257-60, 103 S. Ct. 2985 (1983)). Utah statutes
governing the rights of an unmarried, biological father are
self-operative. "When an illegitimate child is relinquished by
its mother, the rights of the father are automatically
terminated unless he has previously filed an acknowledgment of
paternity." Swavne v. L.D.S. Social Servs., 795 P.2d 637, 640
(Utah 1990). In order to preserve his rights, an unmarried
father must: 1) initiate a proceeding to establish paternity;
2) file notice of the commencement of paternity proceedings;
and 3) pay a fair and reasonable amount of the expenses
incurred by the pregnancy, if he had actual knowledge of it.
See Utah Code Ann. § 78-30-4.14(2)(b) (Supp. 2001); see also In
re Adoption of B.B.D, 1999 UT 70 at ^16. If an unmarried
father fails to "fully and strictly comply" with all of these
conditions before the mother relinquishes the child for
adoption, he "is deemed to have waived and surrendered any
right in relation to the child, including the right to notice
of any judicial proceeding in connection with the adoption of
the child, and his consent to the adoption is not required."
Id. 78-30-4.14(5). Petitioner has failed to establish he has

met any of these requirements. He knew that the mother had
given birth in Utah. Thereafter, the mother and child returned
to North Carolina and temporarily resided with Petitioner.
Nonetheless, Petitioner never took any legal action in either
The Legislature has seen fit to offer additional
protections to unmarried biological fathers residing in another
state. Utah Code Ann. § 78-30-4.15.(4) provides:
The Legislature finds that an unmarried
biological father who resides in another
state may not, in every circumstance, be
reasonably presumed to know of, and strictly
comply with, the requirements of this
chapter. Therefore when all of the following
requirements have been met, that unmarried
biological father may contest an adoption,
prior to the finalization of the decree of
adoption, and assert his interest in the
child; the court may then, in its discretion,
proceed with an evidentiary hearing under
Subsection 78-30-4.16(2):

(d) the unmarried biological father has
complied with the most stringent and complete
requirements of the state where the mother
previously resided or was located, in order
to protect and preserve his parental interest
and right in the child in cases of adoption.
Utah Code Ann. § 78-30-4.15 (4) (d) . In this case, Petitioner
clearly fails to meet at least the requirement under subsection
(d) , because he took absolutely no legal action in his home state
of North Carolina for the five months prior to the mother's
relinquishment. Petitioner has simply failed to take any timely
action to preserve his rights to this child.
Regarding Petitioner's jurisdictional argument, the question
of personal jurisdiction only arises when a defendant is called
to defend an action in court. The district court did not need or
attempt to exercise personal jurisdiction over Petitioner. He
lost his rights to the child by operation of law when he failed
to take the statutory steps required to protect his rights. See
Swavne v. L.D.S. Social Servs. , 795 P. 2d at 640. Furthermore, it
is Petitioner, as a plaintiff, seeking relief in Utah courts who
has invoked the jurisdiction of the Utah courts. The fact that
court action, and the operation of law, affected the father's
unprotected parental rights does not implicate personal
jurisdiction. If Petitioner wants to protect and assert his
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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

FRANK OSBORNE,
Petitioner,
vs.

ADOPTION CENTER OF CHOICE, a
Utah Corporation, JOHN DOE and JANE
DOE, Adoptive Parents,

ORIGINAL PETITION FOR WRIT OF
MANDAMUS AND TEMPORARY
RESTRAINING ORDER
Case No.

Plaintiff Frank Osborne ("Osborne") here submits this Original Petition for Writ of
Mandamus and Temporary Restraining Order. Osborne requests that the Writ of Mandamus issue
against every district court in the State of Utah to enjoin the finalization of an adoption of his son,
Kenneth Skyler Balcer IH, commenced by the defendants agency and adoptive parents, and for a
decree that he may appear in a Utah court to challenge Utah5 s personal jurisdiction over him without
waiving his defense that Utah has no personal jurisdiction over him. He requests that the Temporary
Restraining Order issue against the agency and the adoptive parents to enjoin them from pursuing
said finalization and to compel them to reveal the identity of the adoptive parents so they may be

served with this action and orders therein, and any other actions he may deem necessary to secure
relief,
PERSONS OR ASSOCIATIONS WHOSE INTERESTS MIGHT BE SUBSTANTIALLY
AFFECTED BY THIS PETITION
1.

The several district courts of the State of Utah.

2.

The Adoption Center of Choice, Inc., a Utah Coiporation.

3.

Adoptive parents John Doe and Jane Doe, who have concealed their identity.
ISSUES PRESENTED AND RELIEF SOUGHT

Issue
May a resident of North Carolina who is the natural father of a child who is also a resident
of North Carolina, but which child has been placed for adoption in Utah, make as a plaintiff in a
declaratory judgment action the equivalent of a "special appearance" in a Utah court, in order to
request that said Utah court rule on whether Utah may exercise personal jurisdiction over him and
apply Utah law to him, while at the same time not waiving his personal jurisdiction defense by mere
virtue of his appearance?
Relief Sought
Mr. Osborne requests that this court issue a writ of mandamus against every district court
in the state of Utah to enjoin any proceedings conducted to finalize the adoption of the child at issue
in this matter, issue a temporary restraining order against the respondents from finalizing the
adoption, issue a temporary restraining order against the Adoption Center of Choice to reveal the
identity of the adoptive parents so they may be served and stayed, and finally to issue an order
declaring that Mr. Osborne may either directly intervene in the adoption or bring a collateral action
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underV.H.v.M.L., 894P.2d 1285 (UtaliApp. 1995), to challenge the pending adoption proceeding
on jurisdictional grounds without waiving any personal jurisdiction defense.
SUMMARY OF THE FACTS
The facts of this matter are set forth in the Exhibits attached hereto, which comprise the
record in this matter per Rule 19. This summary is prepared for the Court's convenience, and is
divided into substantive and procedural facts.
Substantive Facts
The following facts issue exclusively from a petition filed by Mr. Osborne On February 14-,
2002, in the Fourth Judicial District Court of Utah County under the Utah Uniform Child Custody
Jurisdiction Enforcement Act (UCCJEA) to challenge that court's subject matter jurisdiction over
any proceeding regarding the adoption or custody of Kenneth Skyler Baker HI. A copy of that
petition is attached as Exhibit 1.
Mr. Osborne is a North Carolina resident with no contacts with Utah whatsoever.

He

entered into a relationship with Angela Baker in November of 2000, and in December, 2000, Ms.
Baker informed him that she was pregnant. Petitioner resolved at that time to provide for the new
child and regarded the new child, Ms. Baker and her son, D.J., as a family unit for which he was
responsible.
In January, 2001, Mr. Osborne bought a new home located at 1201 Alberto Lane in Stanley,
North Carolina. He moved into this home along with Ms. Baker and DJ. hi February, 2001, Ms.
Baker was instructed by her doctor to be on bed rest because her pregnancy was regarded by her
physician as being high risk. She followed the doctor's instructions and continued to live in the
home Mr. Osborne has purchased.
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In March, 2001, Ms. Baker's mother moved into the house. Mr. Osborne too the burden to
support her, also. Ms. Baker continued to live in Mr. Osborne's home through July, 2001. It was
during this month that Ms. Baker first called an adoption agency called An Act of Love. Petitioner
discovered that she had made contact with the adoption agency and expressed his disapproval. Ms.
Baker represented at that point that she would not place the baby for adoption and attributed her
actions to the fact that her psychiatric medications were apparently not working properly. Later that
night, she checked herself into the local mental health center uttering suicide threats.
-After Ms. Baker retumed-from the mental health center and moved back into the home,
petitioner continued his work schedule. One day at work he was informed by a neighbor that Ms.
Baker and her mother had taken all of their possessions from the home and moved out. Petitioner
contacted Ms. Baker's aunt who informed him that she had flown to Utah where a doctor had
induced labor and where she was about to place the baby for adoption.
On August 6,2001, Ms. Baker called petitioner at workfromUtah. She told petitioner that
she had borne a son and that she was coming home with the baby boy and D J . On August 7,2001,
she traveled back to North Carolina by bus. The child was in Utah for one day.
Upon returning, Ms. Baker went to her mother's home for one week. She then indicated that
she wished to return to the residence Mr. Osborne had purchased. Petitioner and his father moved
Ms. Baker and her mother back into the home.
From August to October, 2001, Ms. Baker, Mr. Osborne, D.J. and Ms. Baker's mother lived
together in petitioner's home. Ms. Baker and Mr. Osborne had anumber of conversations regarding
the fact that the child did not bear petitioner's name. During this time also, Ms. Baker would
continue to have episodes of emotional or psychological distress. She would act out inappropriately
and occasionally throw tilings. Petitioner ascribed her conduct to her psychological condition.
4

During this entire time, D.J., Ms. Baker's son, and the baby boy developed a bonding
relationship. Also during the time between August and October, 2001, Mr. Osborne took over the
responsibility of maintaining bookkeeping responsibilities for the family. Their financial situation
thereafter started to improve. Mr. Osborne enlisted the help of his mother in order to balance the
family books.
In November and December, 2001, the financial situation of the family continued to
improve. Ms. Balcer would from time to time express dissatisfaction with not being in control of the
books; but the-financialsituation was improving: D;Jrandihebaby continued~to develop a bonding
relationship during this time.

Thanksgiving 2001 was celebrated with Ms. Baker's family.

Petitioner cooked and prepared the Thanksgiving meal. This was at Ms. Baker's family's residence
in Stanley, North Carolina.
In early December, 2001, in an effort to rectify the fact that the child was not named after
petitioner, petitioner twice secured a blank Affidavit for Voluntary Declaration of Paternity for
execution under North Carolina law. Ms. Balcer signed both of these documents but then became
distressed and ripped the documents up in front of petitioner.
During the month of December, 2001, petitioner and Ms. Baker's relationship deteriorated.
Even so, petitioner and Ms. Baker continued to cohabit in Mr. Osborne's home, and petitioner
continued to provide for Ms. Balcer, D J. and the baby. In mid-December of 2001, the relationship
deteriorated to the point that Ms. Balcer took D. J. and the baby and moved out of the house and took
many of the possessions of both Ms. Balcer and Mr. Osborne with her, includmg Mr. Osborne's tools
of trade. Upon leaving, Ms. Balcer also did damage to the house.
On December 15,2001, Ms. Baker contacted Mr. Osborne's mother and asked if she could
take the baby to the hospital for an ear infection and respiratory distress. She also indicated that she
5

needed those items that she was accustomed to Mr. Osborne providing (diapers, gas drops, formula,
etc.). Petitioner complied with these requests.
On December 28, 2001, Ms. Baker came to petitioner's home and picked up Christmas
presents that had been purchased by Mr. Osborne for both D.J. and for the baby. December 28,
2001, was the last time that Mr. Osborne has seen the baby. In early January, 2002, he received a
call from Ms. Baker, and she left a message on his answering machine stating that she was going to
Utah, and that he "had no chance in hell" of getting him back because Mi*. Osborne could not fight
the State of-Utah and could not win-there.
At this juncture, petitioner called the Department of Social Services in Gastonia, North
Carolina and spoke with Patricia L. Hovis. Later in January, 2002, Ms. Baker returned to North
Carolina and informed petitioner that she had placed the child for adoption with an adoption agency
called The Adoption Center of Choice. Petitioner contacted The Adoption Center of Choice for
information regarding the adoption and was given none.
In his communication with The Adoption Center of Choice, petitioner was informed that
the child had been placed with a set of adoptive parents located in the State of Utah. This
communication was confirmed by further representations made by the adoptive mother, Ms. Baker.
The agency and/or adoptive parents failed to secure the approval of the North Carolina or
Utah administrator of the Interstate Compact for the Placement of Children before the filmg of the
adoption petition in question.
Procedural Facts
1.

As noted, on February 14, 2002, Mr. Osborne filed a UCCJEA petition. In the

petition, Mr. Osborne denied and specifically disavowed seeldng any substantive relieffromthe state
court apart from a ruling that the court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the matter. The
6

challenge to subject matter jurisdiction was predicated on the fact that neither the plaintiff nor the
child were residents of the state of Utah, and that the child had been transported to Utah unlawfully.
2.

In his petition, the plaintiff did not attempt to collaterally attack the adoption that

he has alleged is now pending in the State of Utah, nor did he bring any challenge to the court's
exercise of personal jurisdiction over him. The petition was narrowly tailored pursuant to the terms
of the UCCJEA for the sole purpose of triggering that statute's provisions, which required a
jurisdictional self-examination by the court in which the petition was filed.
-3,

Mr. Osbornefiled-contemporaneouslywith his UCCJEA petition with the Fourth

Judicial District Court an Ex Parte Motion to Open Adoption File under Section 78-30-15, U.C.A.,
requesting that the court issue an order divulging the case number of the pending adoption
proceeding, wherever in the state it might be, in order to secure the identity of the adoptive parents
and to determine the status of the proceeding that had been occurring in derogation of his rights. A
copy of the motion is attached as Exhibit 2, and a copy of the supporting memorandum is attached
as Exhibit 3.
4.

The District Court refused to issue such a mandamus, but rather instructed the clerk

of the Fourth Judicial District, and only the Fourth Judicial District, to search the records for an
adoption concerning Kenneth Skyler Baker IE. The court concluded that it did not have the power
to compel clerks in other districts to conduct such a search, or to divulge the information requested.
A copy of the court's ruling is attached as Exhibit 4.
5.

OnFebruary 19,2002, Mr. Osborne filed a motion to reconsider (Exhibit 5), which

was supported by a memorandum (Exhibit 6) and affidavit of counsel (Exhibit 7). The gravamen of
the motion was that the court unreasonably restricted the scope of the search for information
concerning the adoption case so as to render it meaningless. Accompanying these documents was
7

amotion for order to show cause as to why the Adoption Center of Choice ("the agency") should not
divulge the identifying information of the adoptive parents. This is attached as Exhibit 8.
6.

The court denied the motion that same day, and suggested in its denial that Mr.

Osborne subpoena the information from the agency. Minute entry (Exhibit 9).
7.

Mr. Osborne accepted the court's suggestion and served a subpoena upon the

agency in order to secure the identities of the adoptive parents so that they might be served with a
copy of the petition. The agency was not a named party in the petition. A copy of the subpoena is
attached as Exhibit 10.
8.

The agency filed a motion to quash, supported by a memorandum. A copy of the

motion is attached as Exhibit 11, and a copy of the memorandum is attached as Exhibit 12. Mr.
Osborne responded in a hearing convened in two days after the agency's response was filed. Minutes
of Hearing on Motion to Quash (Exhibit 13). Mr. Osborne also filed a supplemental memorandum,
which advised the court of a recent ruling concerning the limits of personal jurisdiction. That
supplemental memorandum expressly stated that Mr. Osborne did not at that point raise a personal
jurisdiction challenge, but that the court should be aware of the limits of personal jurisdiction and
how those limits favored Mr. Osborne's chances of prevailing. A copy of this memorandum is
attached as Exhibit 14. The agency filed a response, (Exhibit 15), and Mr. Osborne replied (Exhibit
16).
9.

The court ultimately granted the motion to quash. It opined in a memorandum

decision (Exhibit 17) that the UCCJEA did not apply, and further opined that plaintiffs claims
would be barred under the Utah Adoption Code, U.CA. § 78-30-1 et al, were he to challenge the
adoption. The decision was entered on March 18,2002.
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10.

Osborne never raised the adoption code in his petition, but rather, in the course of

attempting to quash the subpoena, the defendant Adoption Center of Choice raised the adoption code
and Osborne's failure to comply therewith. Osborne never responded to the Adoption Center's
challenge to plaintiffs legal rights under the adoption code, itbeing Osborne's consistent contention
that an inquiry into the code's application to him was irrelevant. The Fourth Judicial District Court
for Utah County issued dicta in the memorandum decision regarding the adoption code, dicta that
clearly exceeded the narrow scope of the plaintiffs UCC JEA petition. Furthermore, the court's
-ruling was not final, but was an-interim-ruling-regarding a-motion to quash a subpoena~served on~a
nonparty.
11.

Because the UCC JEA petition was never served on a party, Mr. Osborne dismissed

it under rule 41 on March 27,2002. A copy of the notice of dismissal is attached as Exhibit 18. The
court subsequently signed an order quashing the subpoena on April 4,2002, the last action occurring
in the case. The order is attached as Exhibit 19.
12.

On March 8, 2002, the Adoption Center of Choice filed a Petition for

Determination of Birth Father's Rights with the Fourth Judicial District Court of Utah County, case
no. 022400054. A copy of this petition is attached hereto as Exhibit 20.
13.

Counsel for the Adoption Center sent a letter on March 11, 2002, to Phillip E.

Lowry, counsel to Mr. Osborne in his UCC JEA petition. The letter requested that Mr. Lowry accept
service on behalf of Mr. Osborne. The letter also stated that if service were not accepted "I will
arrange for [Mr. Osborne] to receive notice." A copy of this letter is attached as Exhibit 21.
14.

Mr. Lowry refused to accept service and indicated to the Adoption Center in a letter

dated March 15,2002, that it would have to serve Mr. Osborne personally with the petition, but that
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Mr. Lowry did not believe that this was even possible given that Mr. Osborne was a North Carolina
resident. A copy of this letter is attached hereto as Exhibit 22.
15.

Accompanying the petition filed by the Adoption Center of Choice was a Notice

of Petition for Determination of Birth Father's Rights. This notice was directed to Frank Osborne
care of Phillip Lowry, Esq. A copy of this notice is attached as Exhibit 23.
16.

No proof of service regarding the petition for determination of birth father's rights

has ever been copied to Mr. Lowry, nor has any service been attempted upon Mr. Osborne in North
-Carolina of any court documentsrincluding the Adoption-Petition-or the Petition for Determination
of Birth Father's Rights. In short, the agency's counsel misrepresented himself in his letter of March
11,2002.
17.

On March 21, 2002, three days after the Memorandum Decision in the UCCJEA

action, the agency filed with the Fourth Judicial District Court in case 022400054, a Motion to Allow
Petition for Determination of Birth Father's Rights to Be Heard Without Notice. Filed on the same
day was a Notice to Submit the said motion. A copy of the motion is attached as Exhibit 24, the
supporting memorandum is attached as Exhibit 25, and a copy of the notice to submit is attached as
Exhibit 26.
18.

The same day, March 21, 2002, the agency filed a Motion to Grant Petition for

Determination of Birth Father's Rights. Once again, the agency contemporaneously filed a Notice
to Submit this motion. A copy of the motion is attached as Exhibit 27, and a copy of the notice to
submit is attached as Exhibit 28.
19.

Neither of the motions nor notices to submit were copied to either Mr. Osborne or

his counsel, as reflected in the mailing certificates attached thereto.
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20.

Six days later, on March 27,2002, without having received any input whatsoever

from Mr. Osborne, the Fourth Judicial District Court issued a memorandum decision in case
022400054, in which he granted the agency's motion to have the pending petition heard ex parte.
A copy of this memorandum decision is attached as Exhibit 29. This memorandum decision was
not sent to Mr. Osborne or his counsel.
21.

On April 8,2002, the court executed in case 022400054 an Order Granting Motion

to Allow Petition for Deteimination of Birth Father's Rights to Be Heard without Notice, which was
an order of memorializing thefindings_andconclusions made in the memorandum Tlecisioii regarding
the ex parte nature of the proceedings. A copy of this order is attached as Exhibit 30. The next day,
on April 9, 2002, the court issued an Order regarding Birth Father's Rights, which declared
affirmatively that Mr. Osborne had no rights with respect to the pending Utah adoption. A copy of
this order is attached as Exhibit 31.
22.

Neither of these orders were sent to Mr. Osborne or his counsel.

23.

On April 4,2002, Mr. Osborne filed with the United States District Court of Utah

an action challenging the constitutionality of Utah's construction of the Utah adoption code,
specifically, the statutory law and case law that provided that any appearance whatsoever to intervene
in or challenge a pending Utah adoption would subject the intervener or challenger to personal
jurisdiction in Utah and to the application of Utah law. Mr. Osborne requested a declaration from
the federal court that such a scheme deprived him of due process. A copy of the federal complaint
is attached as Exhibit 32.
24.

Mr. Osborne's counsel first received notice of the April 8,2002, order in the Fourth

Judicial District Court of Utah (the one that allowed determination of his parental rights ex parte)
when he received a copy of it hi the mail on June 10,2002. It was attached to the agency's motion
11

for summary judgment in the federal judicial proceeding. Lowry Federal Affidavit attached hereto
as Exhibit 33.
25.

On June 18, 2002, Mr. Osborne filed a motion for a temporary restraining order

in the federal proceeding to enjoin the agency in the adoptive parents from finalizing the adoption.
The finalization window would close on July 6,2002, and with it would close the revocability of the
adoption process. Copies of the motion for temporary restraining order and the memorandum
supporting the motion are attached as Exhibits 34 and 35.
-26.

On-June 21,-2002,-the Federal District-Court-conducted a hearing on the temporary

restraining order and declined to issue the order based on concerns over the relationship between
federal and state courts. No written record of this denial of relief has yet been generated, hence, none
has been included in the record attached hereto.
REASONS WHY NO OTHER PLAIN, SPEEDY, OR ADEQUATE REMEDY EXISTS
AND WHY A WRIT SHOULD ISSUE
There are two components to the relief that Mr. Osborne seeks. The first has to do with an
immediate crisis: on July 6,2002, the adoptive parents in this matter may proceed with finalization
of the adoption. Under the Utah Adoption Code, an adoption, once finalized, is absolutely
irrevocable and uncontestable. U.C.A. § 78-30-4.16(3). Thus, when six months have elapsed, no
contest to the adoption will be possible, hi this respect Mr. Osborne is a victim of time, and the
defendants are beneficiaries of delay. That is, unless the adoption finalization is enjoined by this
Court.
The second component has to do with why Mr. Osborne has such a difficult time even
crossing the threshold of the Utah courthouse. As the law currently stands, if Mr. Osborne attempts
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to seek relief to stay the adoption proceeding, he will be deemed to waive his best defense: that as
a North Carolina resident, Utah law simply does not apply to him.
WHY IT IS IMPRACTICAL OR INAPPROPRIATE TO FILE THIS WRIT IN THE
DISTRICT COURT
As noted in the statement of facts above, the Fourth Judicial District Court has already
opined that it cannot compel the clerk of any other court to conduct a search of its records so as to
allow Mr. Osborne to intervene in any pending adoption of Kenneth Slcyler Baker IE. The only other
-practical wayto-secure'the information needed to'properly'intefvenerand to~s^life~thFrdentity^of
the adoptive parents so an order enjoining finalizing could be served, and therefore be effective,
would be tofileseparate actions in every county of the state, and hope that everyjudge would agree
that it would be appropriate to search the docket of his or her district in the county. This would all
have to be done before July 6,2002. This is clearly an absurd approach, and one that does not serve,
nor secure, justice. Furtliermore, only a decreefiromthis Court regarding the nature of the special
appearance Mr. Osborne should commence will grant him sufficient safe harbor to proceed.
DATED this 21st dav of June, 2002.

HOWARD, LEWIS ^PETERSEN
Attorneys for Petitioner Frank Osborne
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CERTIFICATE OF HAND-DELIVERY

I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing was hand-delivered to the
following this 21st day of June, 2002.
Larry S. Jenkins, Esq.
Wood Crapo, LLC
60 East South Temple, #500
Salt Lake City, UT 84111
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PHILLIP E. LOWRY (6603), for:
HOWARD, LEWIS & PETERSEN, P.C.
ATTORNEYS AND COUNSELORS AT LAW
120 East 300 North Street
P.O. Box 1248
Provo, Utah 84603
Telephone: (801) 373-6345
Facsimile: (801)377-4991

Our File No.

Attomevs for Petitioner Frank Osborne
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF UTAH COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
IN THE MATTER OF:
KENNETH SKYLER BAKER, m,
A Minor Child.

VERIFIED PETITION
CHALLENGING SUBJECT MATTER
JURISDICTION UNDER UTAH CODE
ANN. SECTION 78-45c-109
Case No. r v ? P 4 D 0 t e £ ^

Judge

^G£S2l_

Division # -—)
Petitioner Frank Osborne here files this petition with the Court challenging its subject
matter jurisdiction to enter a custody determination/adoption decree over petitioner's son, Kenneth
Skyler Baker, ffi. This petition is brought under the Utah Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction
Enforcement Act, Utah Code Ann. § 78-45c-101, et al.
FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS
1.

Petitioner is a resident of Gaston County, North Carolina.

2.

There are three potential respondents to this petition. The first is the Adoption

Center of Choice, a Utah corporation whose principal place of business is in Utah County, Utah. The
other two respondents are the adoptive parents, whose identity is unknown, but who are believed to
be Utah residents.

3.

On November 19,2000, petitioner met .Angela Baker, the birth mother. Petitioner

struck up a relationship with Angela Baker and at the end of November, 2000, petitioner moved into
Ms. Baker's home.
4.

At this time, Ms. Baker had a two-year-old son, D.J. Petitioner developed a

parental relationship with D J. that has persisted to the present date.
5.

On December 10, 2000, Ms. Baker informed petitioner that she was pregnant.

Petitioner resolved at that time to provide for the new child and regarded the new child, Ms. Baker
and Ms. Baker's son, D.J., as a family unit for which he was responsible.
6.

On January 12,2001, petitioner bought anew home located at 1201 Alberto Lane

in Stanley, North Carolina. Petitioner moved into this home along with Ms. Baker and D.J. At this
point, petitioner's relationship with D.J. matured to the point that D.J. called petitioner "Dad."
7.

In February, 2001, Ms. Baker was instructed by her doctor to be on bed rest

because her pregnancy was regarded by her physician as being high risk. She followed the doctor's
instructions and continued to live in the home Mr. Osborne has purchased.
8.

Mr. Osborne maintained the home and provided for Ms. Baker and D. J. Ms. Baker

was not employed during the pregnancy from February forward.
9.

Ms. Baker continued to live in petitioner's home through July, 2001. It was during

this month that Ms. Baker first called an adoption agency called An Act of Love. Petitioner
discovered that she had made contact with the adoption agency and expressed his disapproval. Ms.
Baker represented at that point that she would not place the baby for adoption and attributed her
actions to the fact that her psychiatric medications were apparently not woridng properly. Later that
night, she checked herself into the local mental health center uttering suicide threats.

n

17.

Thanksgiving 2001 was celebrated with Ms. Baker's family. Petitioner cooked and

prepared the Thanks giving meal. This was at Ms. Baker's family's residence in Stanley, North
Carolina.
18.

In early December, 2001, in an effort to rectify the fact that the child was not

named after petitioner, petitioner twice secured a blank Affidavit for Voluntary Declaration of
Paternity for execution under North Carolina law. Ms. Baker signed both of these documents but
then became distressed and ripped the documents up in front of petitioner.
19.

During the month of December, 2001, petitioner and Ms. Baker's relationship

deteriorated. Even so, petitioner and Ms. Baker continued to cohabit in the petitioner's home, and
petitioner continued to provide for Ms. Baker, D.J. and the baby.
20.

On December 10, 2001, the relationship deteriorated to the point that Ms. Baker

took D J . and the baby and moved out of the house and took many of the possessions of both Ms.
Baker and the petitioner with her.
21.

On December 15, 2001, Ms. Baker contacted the petitioner's mother and asked if

she could take the baby to the hospital for an ear infection and respiratory distress. She also
indicated that she needed those items that she was accustomed to the petitioner providing (diapers,
gas drops, formula, etc.). Petitioner complied with these requests.
22.

On December 28, 2001, Ms. Baker came to petitioner's home and picked up

Christmas presents that had been purchased by the petitioner for both D.J. and for the baby.
23.

December 28,2001, was the last time that the petitioner has seen the baby, hi early

January, 2002, he received a call from Ms. Baker, and she left a message on his answering machine
stating that she was going to Utah, and that he "had no chance in hell" of getting him back because
the petitioner could not fight the State of Utah and could not win there.
4

attached as Exhibit A. The address of the court is Clerk of Superior Court, Att'n: Civil. P.O. Box
340, Gastonia, N.C. 28053, and the telephone number for the court is (704) S52-3100.
FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION
(Challenge to Subject Matter Jurisdiction)
31.

Petitioner incorporates previous allegations of this petition consistent with this

32.

The governing law in this matter is Utah Code Ann. § 78-45c-101, et al., otherwise

count.

known as the Utah Child Custody Jurisdiction Enforcement Act.
33.

The Act provides for specific remedies in instances where custody of a child

transported between states is at issue.
34.

Adoption proceedings are specifically covered under the provisions of the Act and

under the applicable precedent of the Utah Court of Appeals.
35.

Specifically, the code defines a child custody proceeding as a proceeding in which

legal custody, physical custody or parent-time with respect to a child is at issue, including a
proceeding for a divorce, separation, neglect, abuse, dependency, guardianship, paternity, termination
of parental rights, and protection from the domestic violence in which the issue may appear. Utah
Code Ann. § 78-45c-l02(4).
36.

The code differentiates between a child's home state and states that are not the

child's home state. A home state is defined as a state in which a child lived with a parent or a person
acting as a parent for at least consecutive months. In the case of a child less than six months of age,
the term means the state in which the child lived from birth with any of the persons mentioned. Utah
Code Ann. § 78-45c-102(7).
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since shortly after the child's birth. (Petitioner also alleges, infra, that no valid proceeding has been
commenced, save the petition for paternity filed in North Carolina, because of several violations of
Utah law).
40.

Under Utah Code Ann. § 78-45c-204, a court of this state has temporary emergency

jurisdiction if a child is present in the state and it is "necessary in an emergency" to protect the child
because of actual or threatened mistreatment or abuse. Utah Code Ann. § 78-45c-204(l). These
facts do not apply in this case.
41.

Even were this Court to find that it could exercise temporary emergency

jurisdiction under Utah Code Ann. § 78-45c-204(l), that jurisdiction is both "temporary" and
"emergency." Accordingly, the code provides that this Court may exercise jurisdiction only until
such time as an order is obtained from the child's home state regarding custody. Utah Code Ann.
§ 78-45c-204(2).
42.

Withrespectto actions that have not yet been reduced to order but are still pending,

the code provides that a court of this state that has been asked to make a child custody determination
under the temporary emergency jurisdiction provision, upon being informed that a child custody
proceeding has been commenced, shall immediately communicate with the other court. If this Court
determines it has temporary emergency jurisdiction, Petitioner here requests that the Court
immediately contact the North Carolina court in Case No. 02-CvD-478 (address and phone number
above) for purposes of resolving any emergency the Court may define as existent, to protect the
safety of the parties (including the petitioner) and the child, and to otherwise make findings and
conclusions with respect to the duration of any temporary custody order this Court may deem it has
jurisdiction to issue pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-45c-204. The communication requirement
is stated in Utah Code Ann. § 78-45c-204(4). (Nonetheless, petitioner here reiterates and contends
8

indisputable facts reveal a plot by the natural mother and adoption agency that is, at best, unseemly
and, at worst, illegal.
46.

For these reasons, the Court should deem the adoption petition as filed in bad faith

in that the conduct of the adoption agency and the adoptive parents is unjustifiable and, therefore,
should decline to exercise jurisdiction under Utah Code Ann. § 78-45c-208.
47.

The custody proceeding at issue in this matter (namely, the adoption petition which

this petition collaterally attacks) is further void and of no effect as to the petitioner because the
petitioner received no notice thereof nor was served with proceed therein. The Utah Uniform Child
Custody Jurisdiction Enforcement Act contains specific notice provisions regarding custody
determinations. Utah Code Ann. § 78-45c-205. The code specifically states that "this chapter does
not govern the enforceability of a child custody determination made without notice and an
opportunity to be heard." Utah Code Ann. § 78-45c-205(2).
48.

The custody proceeding at issue in this matter (namely, the adoption petition which

this petition collaterally attacks) is further void and of no effect because of the respondents' failure
to comply with the Interstate Compact for the Placement of Children, adopted by Utah at U.C.A. §
62A-4a-701. The North Carolina Compact Administrator has officially protested the violation of
the Compact (a copy of the protest is attached as Exhibit B). Such a violation constitutes a violation
of the laws of the State of Utah, and renders void the filing of the adoption petition in question.
49.

Section 78-45c-308 of the code allows for expedited enforcement of child custody

determinations. Petitioner here requests that the Court immediately schedule a hearing on the issue
of whether it has jurisdiction over custody of this child. The code specifically states that the hearing
in question shall be held on the next judicial day following the service or process, unless that date
is impossible. In that event, the Court shall hold the hearing on the first day possible. Petitioner here
10

WHEREFORE, Petitioner prays for relief as follows:
1.

That the adoption file in this matter to be opened so as to effect service on the
respondents and to investigate the pending proceedings;

2.

That this court declare that it lacks subject matter jurisdiction over the pending
adoption proceeding, or that it decline to exercise jurisdiction;

3.

That upon finding it has no jurisdiction or that it declines jurisdiction, that it
communicate this result to the Superior Court of Gaston County, North Carolina,
so that that court may make an appropriate determination of custody over the child;

4.

That upon such court reaching a custody determination (whether such custody be
vested in an individual or the North Carolina Department of Social Services, and
whether it be temporary or permanent), that this Court vest such determination
with full faith and credit after proper registration of the North Carolina court order
in the State of Utah, and this Court at that time enforce said order by issuing such
writs as it deems proper, including a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to the Utah
UCCJEA.

DATED this / r

day of February, 2002.

HOWARD, LEWIS & PETERSEN
Attorneys for Petitioner Frank Osborne
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STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA
Gaston

02-CvD-

4S&

in The General Cour Of JJS^C
^ ] District , Supenor Covn Divs

County

l/Vflmc Of Plaintiff

! F r a n k Edward O s b o r n e ,

Jr.

Adorass

CIVIL SUMMONS
[City

Sis ft

2tp

1A

VERSUS
Name Of

Ruies

DafendanMst

I

Angela

1

Catherine

I Alias end Piunes S u m m o n s

Baker
Dale

LBS! Summons

Issued

To Each Of The Defendant^) Named Below:
Mama And Addrasi

Of Datanaanl

Nome A no Address 0/ Dafanoant 2

1

Angela Catherine Baker
9711 Wlllllyxi U n e
Charlotte, NC 28214

A Civil Action Has Been Commenced Against Youi
You Bre notified to appear and answer the complaint of the plaintiff as follows
1

Serve a copy of your written enswer to the complaint upon the plaintiff or plaintiff's attorney within thirty [,
days after you have been served. You may serve your answer by delivering a copy to the plaintiff or by ma
to the plaintiff's last known address, Bnd

2

File the original of the written answer with the Clerk of Superior Court of the county named above.

If you fail to answer the complaint, the plaintiff will apply to the Court for the relief demanded in the complaini
Nmmm And Addntas

Of PtmintlfT a Attorn my ftf Nona. Aoormaa Of

Plaintiff)

Richard B. Schultz
P. 0. Box 1232
Gaatonia, North Carolina 2B053

•

ENDORSEMENT
This Summons was originally ISBued on the date
indicated above and returned not served. At the
request of the plaintiff, the time within which this
Summons must be served Is extended thirty (30)
days.

NOTE T O PARTIES:

Dtia Of Bndorsomant

' Tim 9

Q AM
\ Signature

I
Deputy CSC

Assistant CSC

I Civr* Of Suoerw

Many countlas hava MANDATORY
ARBITRATION
programs m which most cases where the amount in conirovt
SI 5,000 or lass are hoard by on arbitrator before a WBI The parties will be notified if this case *s assigned for
arbitration,
and, if so, what procedure is TO be
followed

AOC C V . 1 0 0
(Over)

2001,
said
minor
child
resided
with
the
Defendant
and
the
Defendant's
mother
at
12214
Sherman
Drive,
Charlotte,
North
Carolina*
that from August
16, 2001, until December
10, 2001,
said m i n o r o h i l d
reeided
w i t h tho P l a i n t i f f ,
the D e f e n d a n t and
the D e f e n d a n t ' *
mother
at
1201
Alberto
Lane,
Stanley,
North
C a r o l i n a j t h a t on D e o e m b e r
1 0 , 2 0 0 1 , said
minor
c h i l d and the
P l a i n t i f f w a n t to t h e r e s i d e n c e of the P l a i n t i f f ' s m o t h e r at 3 6 0 0
Enfield
Road, Charlotte,
North
Carolina:
that
on D e c e m b e r
11,
2001,
the
Defendant
took
said
minor
child
to
reside
at
the
residence
of
the
Defendant's
grandmother
at
5631
Candlcwood
Drive, C h a r l o t t e , N o r t h C a r o l i n a j that said m i n o r child continued
to r e s i d e w i t h t h e D e f e n d a n t at s a i d r e s i d e n c e u n t i l on or a b o u t
J a n u a r y 4, 2 0 0 2 , w h e n , u p o n i n f o r m a t i o n a n d b e l i e f , the D e f e n d a n t
o n c e a g a i n t o o k e a i d m i n o r o h i l d to the S t a t e of U t a h , u h e r e the
Defendant,
upon I n f o r m a t i o n
and
belief,
arranged
to give
said
minor
child
up
for
adoption,
without
the
consent
of
tho
Plaintiff•
7.
T h e r e h a v e b e e n no p r i o r a c t i o n s in t h i s or any o t h e r
J u r i e d i c t i o n c o n c e r n i n g the c u s t o d y of s a i d m i n o r c h i l d , eave and
e x c e p t f o r o n e or m o r e d o m e s t i c v i o l e n c e a o t l o n e f i l e d in 2001 in
either Mecklenburg
County and/or
Gaston County, North
Carolina,
between
the
Plaintiff
and
the
Defendant,
wherein
temporary
c u s t o d y of e a i d m i n o r c h i l d w a s s o u g h t by t h e D e f e n d a n t .
8.
T h e P l a i n t i f f k n o w e of no o n e o t h e r t h a n the
Defendant
w h o ie a r e a l p a r t y in i n t e r e s t c o n c e r n i n g the c u s t o d y of said
minor ohild.
9.
The
primary care,
the p a r t i e s *

Plaintiff
ie a f i t and
proper
c u s t o d y , t u i t i o n and c o n t r o l of

p e r s o n to have
the
s a i d m i n o r child of

10.
It w o u l d be c o n s i s t e n t
w i t h t h e b o o t i n t e r e s t s of said
m i n o r o h i l d of the p a r t i e s to bo in t h e p r i m a r y
c u s t o d y of the
Plaintiff.
11.
F o r a v a r i e t y of r e a s o n s , t h e D e f e n d a n t ie not
a fit
and p r o p e r p e r e o n t o h a v e the c u e t o d y o f s a i d m i n o r c h i l d , m o s t
d e m o n s t r a b l y by n a e o n of the f a c t t h a t t h e D e f e n d a n t h a s o o u g h t
to have no f u r t h e r
r e l a t i o n e h i p w i t h s a i d m i n o r o h i l d by g i v i n g
• a i d m i n o r c h i l d up f o r a d o p t i o n in t h e S t a t e of U t a h .
12.
E x c e p t for the fact that said m i n o r child was actually
b o r n in t h e S t a t e
of U t a h a n d t h a t t h o D e f e n d a n t
approximately
one m o n t h a g o t o o k iiaid m i n o r o h i l d to t h e S t a t e of U t a h to be
given
up
for
adoption,
neither
party
has
any
significant
c o n n e c t i o n w i t h t h e S t a t e of U t a h .
13*
It w o u l d be o o n o i e t e n t w i t h t h e b o u t i n t e r e s t s of oaid
m i n o r o h i l d f o r t h e P l a i n t i f f l © p a t e r n i t y of e a i d m i n o r child to
be c o n c l u s i v e l y e s t a b l i s h e d v i a g e n e t i c t e s t i n g .
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GASTON COUNTY
DEPARTMENT OF SOCIAL SERVICES
Children & Family Services
330 N. Marietta St.

Gastonia, North Carolina 28052
(704) 862-7530 (704) 862-7898 - FAX

Keith A. Moon
Director

01-23-3002

North Carolina Department of Health and Human Services
Divisionpof Social Services - Interstate Adoptions
325 N. Salisbury St.
2411 Mail Service Center
Raleigh,i:NC 27699-2411
Attn: Linda Wrightson
Interstate Adoption Consultant

Re:

Cjjiild - Kenneth Skyler Baker (born 08-06-2001)
Mother - Angela Catherine Wilkinson Baker
Father - Franklin Edward Osborne

Dear Ms|i wrightson:
We wou(ti like to make you aware of a potential adoption situation which we feel
falls within the jurisdiction of the Interstate Compact yet we are not aware of any
attemptsjat compliance. This case involves a North Carolina mother and child. In
the past jjnonth the mother took the child to Utah where she relinquished him for
adoptionjito The Adoption Center of Choice. Upon doing so, she returned to North
Carolina. The birth father here had been very involved with the mother and child.
Howeverjishe did not notify'him of her plans to surrender the child nor has the
agency iijj Utah involved him in the planning.

It is our Contention that both mother and child have North Carolina residency thus to
ensure ttte safety and well being of the child, Interstate Services are needed.
In order po give you insight into this matter, we are providing a detailed written
report oq! the situation as It was brought to our attention. The birth mother is a legal
resident Of Mecklenburg County, NC and the birth father resides in Gaston County,
NC.

Case Regarding Kenneth Skvler- Born 08-06-2001
Date: 01-23-2002
Birth Mother:

Angela C. Baker
6331 Candlewood Dr.
Charlotte, NC 28210

Birth Father:

Franklin E. Osborne
1201 Alberto Lane
Stanley, NC 28164

Introduction:
Our agency has had a number of contacts in January 2002 from a Gaston County
resident]! Frank Osborne, vyho Is concerned over the fact that earlier this month, his
ex-girlfri|nd, Angela Baker, took their infant son to Utah without his knowledge or
consent and relinquished him for adoption. Mr. Osborne was in need of direction
and guidance. He stats hei loves his son and does not agree with a plan of adoption.
We havejencouraged him to contact an attorney about pursuing this legally. At the
sametiniie, we have some Questions about how this potential adoption Is being
handled land about the need for ICPC intervention and jurisdiction.
In order p determine the situation and circumstances that led to this point, we
asked Mij. Osborne to provide us a chronology of his relationship with Ms. Baker
from thejjtime of Skyier's conception to the present and of how this relinquishment
in Utah qame to be.
The following narrative documents what we have been advised in a series of
interviews.
Summary:
Frank Osborne and Angela 3aker had an established boyfriend/girlfriend relationship
when thejy moved In together in 2000; this residence was in Mecklenburg County. It
was dunfflg this time of cohabitation that she became pregnant.
Mr, Osborne, looking towards the future, purchased his current home in Gaston
County, rtjC. He and a pregnant Angela Baker moved in during January 2001,
They remained together throughout the pregnancy until just before the child was
born.

•*

Apparerkly some sort of restraining order was also issued pending a hearing
becaus4iM5. Baker continued to live in Mr. Osborne's Gaston County home with the
baby wriflle Mr.Osborne stayed with his mother in Charlotte.
They never reunited as a couple following the December 2001 break up but were
able to Establish some level of rapport. On at least five different dates between
December 12 and 23, she brought Skyler to visit Mr. Osborne. She was then living
in Meckijsnburg County witti her sons.
She was]jjscheduled to bring Skyler to visit Mr. Osborne on December 28. However
she ca lldd him to cancel stating there had been a death in the family so she had to
chanqe fjer plans; Caller ID showed this call was made from her grandmother's
Mecklenpurg County, NC home.
The nextj information Mr.Osborne received regarding his son came from a mutual
friend who called on 01-05-2002 to inform him that Ms. Baker had gone to Utah and
surrendered Skyler for adoption to an agency there. Desperate, Mr. Osborne and
his mother made multiple calls to Utah trying to locate her and/or the agency
involved
Finally on] 01-06-2002 theyjfound the motel where she stayed while surrendering
Skyler but were told she had just checked out. On 01-07-2002, they saw her here
in North Carolina. She is staying at her grandmother's home in Charlotte, NC.
ji

Mr. Osbcfne last saw her approximately 01-20-2002 when the two were in court
regarding charges they had taken out. These were dismissed. Apparently both
parties have taken out assarted charges on each other. All but one taken out by Ms.
Baker agjjinst Mr. Osborne have been dismissed and that one is not scheduled for a
hearing until the end of this: month.
With Internet assistance and a lot of persistence, Mr. Osborne located the adoption
agency irflyoived in this surrender - The Adoption Center of Choice in Orem, Utah.
Reported V officials there told him he essentially had no parental rights and was
"only one] (of three" possibilities as the birth father. They have initiated no efforts to
contact o involve him at any time in the planning for his son.
When wejiquizzed him about the paternity issue, he stated he has no doubts that he
is the father of Skyler. He was living with Angela Baker before conception, at
conceptiojp, and until the end of the pregnancy. He said she was not involved with
other merfj during that time and has said this now in an effort to hamper his ability
to stop thie adoption.
Frank Osrjorne states he is committed to providing for his son and does not want
him placejjl for adoption. Mr, Osborne's mother has expressed her support for her
son's effoirts, her love for her grandson, and her willingness to help in any way.

5

Carolinafiand signed paternity affidavits naming Frank Osborne as his birth father
with no iother possibilities named.
Therefore we feel that the;placement of this child across state lines for adoption,
whiles ^gal option for the mother, Is a matter that falls within the jurisdiction of the
Interstate Compact for Placement of Children since Skyler is a North Carolina
residentiivlth planned placement in Utah.
We ask that the North Carolina ICPC office pursue this to insure legal compliance,
protectidh of all parties' rights, and the well being of Kenneth Skyler Baker.

Prepared; bv:

Patricia l|| Hovis
Social Wflrk Supervisor III
Gaston Clbunty Department of Social Services Adoption Program
330 N. Nftrletta Street
GastonlajjrC 28052

01-23-2002
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IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
IN THE MATTER OF:
KENNETH SKYLER BAKER, IE,

| MEMORANDUM DECISION
| Case No. 0204026^-

A Minor Child.
| Date: March 18, 2002
| Judge Steven L. Hansen

Before the Court is a Motion to Quash Subpoena filed by Adoption Center of Choice, Inc.
("Adoption Center"). The Court, having heard oral argument, and reviewed and considered all
relevant memoranda, including the supplemental memoranda filed while this Motion was under
advisement, now grants Adoption Center's Motion.
FACTS
1.

Adoption Center is an adoption agency licensed by the State of Utah.

2.

On or about January 4, 2002, Angela Baker relinquished her son, Kenneth Skyler Baker,

to Adoption Center xo be placed for adoption in Utah.
3.

Kenneth was born in Utah on August 6, 2001. His birth certificate lists no father, only

Angela as the birth mother.
4.

On January 15, 2002, Angela Baker's husband, Donny Baker, who is not the birth father

but is the legal father, gave written consent to Kenneth's placement for adoption.
5.

Frank Osborne, a resident of the State of North Carolina and petitioner in this action,

claims to be Kenneth's birth father. Osborne commenced a paternity and custody action in North
Carolina on February 11, 2002.
6.

Kenneth was placed with a family for adoption sometime previous to February 11, 2002.

7.

On February 14, 2002, Osborne filed a verified petition challenging subject matter

jurisdiction of the Court in this matter, along with an ex parte motion to open the adoption file,

and a motion for order to show cause.
8.

This Court granted the ex parte motion in part on February 15, 2002. The Court ordered

the adoption file opened, but only if the file could be identified through a search of Court records.
Osborne has apparently been unable to identify the adoption file.
9.

The Court declined to grant Osborne an order requiring Adoption Center to disclose the

identities of the adoptive parents and denied Osborne's motion to reconsider the ex parte order of
February 15.
10.

On February 21, 2002, Osborne served Adoption Center with a subpoena seeking

disclosure of the identities of the adoptive parents, the attorneys involved in the filing of the
adoption petition, the county in which the petition was filed, the names of any judges who have
issued rulings or orders in the case, and the case number of the file.
11.

On February 26, 2002, Adoption Center responded with this Motion to Quash Subpoena.
ANALYSIS AND RULING
Adoption Center argues that it should be protected from subpoena for the following

reasons. First, the identities of the adoptive parents of Kenneth are protected and confidential
under the regulations governing state licensed child-placement agencies. Second, assuming Frank
Osborne is Kenneth's biological father, he has completely waived any right that he might have
with respect to Kenneth under the Utah code. Third, Adoption Center asserts that because the
adoption of Kenneth is not final, Adoption Center still has legal custody and control of Kenneth,
and Osborne does not need the identities of the adoptive parents to protect his interests.
The Court concludes that Adoption Center's analysis of the applicable law is accurate.
Child placing agencies are required to treat all adoption records as confidential, and "[n]o
information [should] be shared with any person without the appropriate consent forms." Utah
Admin. Code § R501-7-4(A)(15) (2002). Because these records are confidential and protected by
law, the Court must quash or modify any subpoena requiring disclosure when no exception or
waiver applies. UtahR Civ. Pro. 45(c)(3)(A)(iii) (2001). The court concludes that Osborne has
not articulated any waiver or exception that should apply in this case.

Further, Frank Osborne has not complied with the legal requirements for preserving his
parental rights under Utah law. The legislature has established the standard that must be met by
an unmarried biological father to preserve his rights, stating very clearly that "[he] is presumed to
know that the child may be adopted without his consent unless he strictly complies with the
provisions of [Utah Code Title 78, Chapter 30], manifests a prompt and full commitment to his
parental responsibilities, and establishes paternity." Utah Code Ann. § 78-30-4.12(3)(e) (2001).
If the unmarried biological father does not strictly comply with the statutory requirements, he "is
deemed to have waived and surrendered any right in relation to the child . . . and his consent to
the adoption of the child is not required." § 78-30-4.14(5). When a child is under six months old
and placed for adoption, as Kenneth was, the biological father must (1) initiate paternity
proceedings in accordance with the Code, (2) file notice of the paternity proceedings with the
state registrar of vital statistics, and (3) if he had actual knowledge of the pregnancy, pay a fair
and reasonable amount of the expenses incurred during the pregnancy and birth. § 78-304.14(2)(b). All of the requirements must be met "prior to the time the mother executes her
consent for adoption or relinquishes the child to a licensed child-placing agency." Id.
The Utah Supreme Court interpreted these statutory requirements in In re Adoption of
B.B.D., 984 P.2d 967 (Utah 1999). The facts of In re B.B.D. are strikingly similar to the current
case, and this Court finds that the principles of that case apply squarely here as well. The father in
that case "failed to take any action to establish paternity according to [Utah's] statutory scheme,"
id. at 971, and so waived and surrendered any right he had to his child. Similarly, Frank Osborne
did not comply with the first two requirements offilingfor paternity and filing proper notice of
the action with the state of Utah. Angela Baker relinquished her child to Adoption Center on or
about January 4, and Osborne did not file a paternity action until February 11 in North Carolina.
He has still not filed an action in Utah, aside from his petition challenging the jurisdiction of the
Court. Osborne has failed to take any action according to the statutory requirements, and so has
waived any right to Kenneth he may have otherwise had. Having so waived those rights, the
Court concludes that the information Osborne seeks by the subpoena is of no worth to Mr.

Osborne.
Adoption Center makes the additional point that it stands as the legal custodian of
Kenneth from the date his mother relinquished him until the time the adoption is finalized. This
assertion is correct according to Utah Code Annotated § 78-30-4.22, which states that the childplacing agency has "custody and control" during that period of time. Osborne can assert his
interests directly against Adoption Center and has no need to discover the identities of Kenneth's
adoptive parents.
In oral argument before the court, Osborne attempted to show that the Utah Uniform
Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act (UCCJEA), Utah Code Ann. § 78-45c-101 to
318, applied to deny the Court jurisdiction over the matter before it. In making that argument,
Osborne seemed to be attempting to bifurcate the definition of an "adoption proceeding" into two
separate actions, one a child custody action and the other an action to terminate the parental
rights of the natural parents. However, to make the argument that the UCCJEA applies to the
current proceedings with regard to Kenneth's adoption, Osborne must somehow circumvent § 7845c-103, which clearly states: "This chapter [the UCCJEA] does not govern: (1) an adoption
proceeding . . . ." The Court does not agree with Osborne that these proceedings regarding
Kenneth's adoption should properly be construed as anything but an "adoption proceeding" in the
plain language of the statute. The UCCJEA does not apply here, as evidenced by its plain
language.
CONCLUSION
In summary, the Court concludes that the subpoena of Adoption Center should be
quashed. Adoption Center has a legal duty to keep the contents of the adoption file, including the
names of the adoptive parents, confidential. Because the adoption file is legally protected, the
Court is required to quash or modify any subpoena of its contents absent any exception or waiver.
Osborne, having not strictly complied with the Utah adoption statutes, has not preserved any of
his rights with respect to Kenneth under Utah law, and cannot show good cause why the file
should be opened when he is free to proceed directly against Adoption Center. Therefore,

Adoption Center's Motion to Quash Subpoena is granted for the reasons stated above.
Adoption Center's counsel is to prepare an order consistent with this ruling and submit it
for the Court's signature.
DATED this

/ £
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BY THE COURT
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IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
IN THE MATTER OF KENNETH SKYLER MINUTE ENTRY
BAKER m,
Case No. OZd^OOb^
A Minor.
Date: February 19, 2002
Judge Claudia Laycock
Before the Court is Petitioner's Motion for Order to Show Cause Re: Respondent
Adoption Center of Choice. The Court having conferred with another Judge in this District as per
Petitioner's request, now denies Petitioner's Motion. The Court concludes that the most efficient
way to obtain the desired information is through a subpoena duces tecum. Petitioner will then be
entitled to all remedies available under the law if the Agency fails to comply with the subpoena.
DATED this

[lY^-

day of

[^ftO-iM

2002
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IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
IN THE MATTER OF:
KENNETH SKYLER BAKER, m ,

MEMORANDUM DECISION
CaseNo. 0204 02&r-

A Minor Child.
Date: March 18, 2002
Judge Steven L. Hansen

Before the Court is a Motion to Quash Subpoena filed by Adoption Center of Choice, Inc.
("Adoption Center"). The Court, having heard oral argument, and reviewed and considered all
relevant memoranda, including the supplemental memoranda filed while this Motion was under
advisement, now grants Adoption Center's Motion.
FACTS
1.

Adoption Center is an adoption agency licensed by the State of Utah.

2.

On or about January 4, 2002, Angela Baker relinquished her son, -Kenneth Skyler Baker,

to Adoption Center to be placed for adoption in Utah.
3.

Kenneth was born in Utah on August 6, 2001. His birth certificate lists no father, only

Angela as the birth mother.
4.

On January 15, 2002, Angela Baker's husband, Donny Baker, who is not the birth father

but is the legal father, gave written consent to Kenneth's placement for adoption.
5.

Frank Osborne, a resident of the State of North Carolina and petitioner in this action,

claims to be Kenneth's birth father. Osborne commenced a paternity and custody action in North
Carolina on February 11, 2002.
6.

Kenneth was placed with a family for adoption sometime previous to February 11, 2002.

7.

On February 14, 2002, Osborne filed a verified petition challenging subject matter

jurisdiction of the Court in this matter, along with an ex parte motion to open the adoption file,

and a motion for order to show cause
8

This Court granted the ex parte motion in part on February 15, 2002 The Court ordered

the adoption file opened, but only if the file could be identified through a search of Court records
Osborne has apparently been unable to identify the adoption file
9.

The Court declined to grant Osborne an order requiring Adoption Center to disclose the

identities of the adoptive parents and denied Osborne's motion to reconsider the ex parte order of
February 15.
10

On February 21, 2002, Osborne served Adoption Center with a subpoena seeking

disclosure of the identities of the adoptive parents, the attorneys involved in the filing of the
adoption petition, the county in which the petition was filed, the names of any judges who have
issued rulings or orders in the case, and the case number of the file
11.

On February 26, 2002, Adoption Center responded with this Motion to Quash Subpoena.
ANALYSIS AND RULING
Adoption Center argues that it should be protected from subpoena for the following

reasons First, the identities of the adoptive parents of Kenneth are protected and confidential
under the regulations governing state licensed child-placement agencies Second, assuming Frank
Osborne is Kenneth's biological father, he has completely waived any right that he might have
with respect to Kenneth under the Utah code Third, Adoption Center asserts that because the
adoption of Kenneth is not final, Adoption Center still has legal custody and control of Kenneth,
and Osborne does not need the identities of the adoptive parents to protect his interests
The Court concludes that Adoption Center's analysis of the applicable law is accurate
Child placing agencies are required to treat all adoption records as confidential, and u[n]o
information [should] be shared with any person without the appropriate consent forms " Utah
Admin. Code § R501-7-4(A)(15) (2002) Because these records are confidential and protected by
law, the Court must quash or modify any subpoena requiring disclosure when no exception or
waiver applies Utah R. C/v. Pro 45(c)(3)(A)(iii) (2001) The court concludes that Osborne has
not articulated any waiver or exception that should apply in this case

Further, Frank Osborne has not complied with the legal requirements for preserving his
parental rights under Utah law. The legislature has established the standard that must be met by
an unmarried biological father to preserve his rights, stating very clearly that "[he] is presumed to
know that the child may be adopted without his consent unless he strictly complies with the
provisions of [Utah Code Title 78, Chapter 30], manifests a prompt and full commitment to his
parental responsibilities, and establishes paternity." Utah Code Ann. § 78-30-4.12(3)(e) (2001).
If the unmarried biological father does not strictly comply with the statutory requirements, he "is
deemed to have waived and surrendered any right in relation to the child . . . and his consent to
the adoption of the child is not required." § 78-30-4.14(5). When a child is under six months old
and placed for adoption, as Kenneth was, the biological father must (1) initiate paternity
proceedings in accordance with the Code, (2) file notice of the paternity proceedings with the
state registrar of vital statistics, and (3) if he had actual knowledge of the pregnancy, pay a fair
and reasonable amount of the expenses incurred during the pregnancy and birth. § 78-304.14(2)(b). All of the requirements must be met "prior to the time the mother executes her
consent for adoption or relinquishes the child to a licensed child-placing agency." Id.
The Utah Supreme Court interpreted these statutory requirements in In re Adoption of
B.B.D., 984 P.2d 967 (Utah 1999). The facts of Zw re B.B.D. are strikingly similar to the current
case, and this Court finds that the principles of that case apply squarely here as well. The father in
that case "failed to take any action to establish paternity according to [Utah's] statutory scheme,"
id. at 971, and so waived and surrendered any right he had to his child. Similarly, Frank Osborne
did not comply with the first two requirements offilingfor paternity and filing proper notice of
the action with the state of Utah. Angela Baker relinquished her child to Adoption Center on or
about January 4, and Osborne did not file a paternity action until February 11 in North Carolina.
He has still not filed an action in Utah, aside from his petition challenging the jurisdiction of the
Court. Osborne has failed to take any action according to the statutory requirements, and so has
waived any right to Kenneth he may have otherwise had. Having so waived those rights, the
Court concludes that the information Osborne seeks by the subpoena is of no worth to Mr.

Osborne.
Adoption Center makes the additional point that it stands as the legal custodian of
Kenneth from the date his mother relinquished him until the time the adoption is finalized. This
assertion is correct according to Utah Code Annotated § 78-30-4.22, which states that the childplacing agency has "custody and control" during that period of time. Osborne can assert his
interests directly against Adoption Center and has no need to discover the identities of Kenneth's
adoptive parents.
In oral argument before the court, Osborne attempted to show that the Utah Uniform
Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act (UCCJEA), Utah Code Ann. § 78-45c-101 to
318, applied to deny the Court jurisdiction over the matter before it. In making that argument,
Osborne seemed to be attempting to bifurcate the definition of an "adoption proceeding" into two
separate actions, one a child custody action and the other an action to terminate the parental
rights of the natural parents. However, to make the argument that the UCCJEA applies to the
current proceedings with regard to Kenneth's adoption, Osborne must somehow circumvent § 7845c-103, which clearly states: "This chapter [the UCCJEA] does not govern: (1) an adoption
proceeding . . . ." The Court does not agree with Osborne that these proceedings regarding
Kenneth's adoption should properly be construed as anything but an "adoption proceeding" in the
plain language of the statute. The UCCJEA does not apply here, as evidenced by its plain
language.
CONCLUSION
In summary, the Court concludes that the subpoena of Adoption Center should be
quashed. Adoption Center has a legal duty to keep the contents of the adoption file, including the
names of the adoptive parents, confidential. Because the adoption file is legally protected, the
Court is required to quash or modify any subpoena of its contents absent any exception or waiver.
Osborne, having not strictly complied with the Utah adoption statutes, has not preserved any of
his rights with respect to Kenneth under Utah law, and cannot show good cause why the file
should be opened when he is free to proceed directly against Adoption Center. Therefore,

Adoption Center's Motion to Quash Subpoena is granted for the reasons stated above
Adoption Center's counsel is to prepare an order consistent with this ruling and submit it
for the Court's signature
DATED this
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Attorneys for Petitioner Frank Osborne

IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF UTAH COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
IN THE MATTER OF:
NOTICE OF DISMISSAL
KENNETH SKYLER BAKER, m,
A Minor Child.

CaseNo.020400623
Judge Hansen

Pursuant to Rule 41(a)l, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, petitioner herein files this Notice
of Dismissal of his petition.
DATED this 27th day of March, 2002.

PHmjP / ]BrL6l^Yv4ar:
HOWARD, LEWIS & PETERSEN
Attorneys for Petitioner Frank Osborne

MAILING CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing was mailed to the following,
postage prepaid, this

day of March, 2002.

Larry S. Jenkins, Esq.
Wood & Crapo
500 Eagle Gate Tower
60 East South Temple
Salt Lake City, UT 84603

SECRETARY

» s«

;ourt

WOOD CRAPO LLC
Larry S. Jenkins (4854)
Richard J. Armstrong (7461)
500 Eagle Gate Tower
60 East South Temple
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801) 366-6060
Attorneys for The Adoption Center of Choice

IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR THE STATE OF UTAH
IS AND FOR UTAH COUNTY

IN THE MATTER OF:
KENNETH SKYLER BAKER, III,
A Minor Child.

ORDER QUASHING SUBPOENA
Probate No. 020400623
Judge Hansen

Third-party Adoption Center of Choice, Inc.'s ("Adoption Center") motion to
quash subpoena came on for hearing on March 1,2002. Adoption Center was represented by
Larry S. Jenkins, and petitioner was represented by Phillip E. Lowry. The Court heard argument
and took the matter under advisement. Now, after reviewing the memoranda submitted by the
parties, and the pleadings and papers on file, and good cause appearing therefor, the Court is of
the opinion that the motion to quash should be GRANTED. Accordingly,
IT IS ORDERED that Adoption Center's motion to quash the subpoena issued on
February 21,2002, and served on Adoption Center on February 22,2002 (the "Subpoena"), is
GRANTED; and
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Subpoena is hereby QUASHED.

DATED this _^fday of M^ch, 2002.
BY THE COURT.

H^^

Stev£nJ<J3ankki—J
Fourth Distnct Court Judge
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on t h e ^ day of March, 2002, a true and correct copy
of the foregoing ORDER QUASHING SUBPOENA was mailed in the U.S. Mail, first-class
postage prepaid, to:
Phillip E. Lowry
Howard, Lewis & Peterson, P-.C.
120 East 300 North Street
P.O. Box 1248
Provo,Utah 84603
Attorneys for Petitioner Frank Osborne
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W O O D L.RAPO LLC
ATTORNEYS AT LAW
MARY ANNE Q WOOD
DAVID J. CRAPO

5 0 0

LARRY S JENKINS
DARRYLJ. LEE

E A G L £

G A T £

T O W E R

60 EAST SOUTH TEMPLE
SALT LAKE ClTY, UTAH 8 4 1 1 1

KAIHRYN OGDEN BALMFORTH

RICHARD L EVANS
PAMELA B. HUNSAKER
SHERIA MOWER
STEPHEN G. WOOD
JOI GARDNER PEARSON
OF COUNSEL

G.TROY PARKINSON

FACSIMILE (801)

366-6061

March 11,2002

KAR 1 k 2002
HOWARD, LEWIS 4 PETERSEN

Phillip E. Lowry
Howard, Lewis & Peterson, P.C.
120 East 300 North Street
P.O. Box 1248
Provo,Utah 84603
Re: In re Kenneth Skyler Baker, III
Dear Phil:
I received your letter and supplemental memorandum. Having reviewed the case
you cite, it does not appear that it applies to the proceeding you filed or to the adoption of the
child. Consequently, Adoption Center of Choice will not comply with your demand.
Friday, we filed a separate proceeding under Utah Code Ann. § 78-30-4.24 and
the Declaratory Judgment Act to obtain a determination of your client's rights. I have enclosed a
copy of that petition, along with a notice of the petition and an acceptance of service. I think the
personal jurisdiction issue may be best raised by your client in this new matter because it would
eliminate the question of the applicability of the UCCJEA to adoption proceedings. Please let
me know as soon as possible if you cannot accept service for your client and I will arrange for
him to receive notice.

Sincerely,

cc: James Webb

Larry S. Jenkins

HOWARD, LEWIS & PETERSEN, P.C.
Jackson Howard
Don R. Petersen
Craig M. Snyder
JohnL. Valentine
D. David Lambert
Leslie W. Slaugh

ATTORNEYS AND COUNSELORS AT LAW
120 East 300 North Street
Post Office Box 1248
Provo, Utah 84603
Telephone: (801) 373-6345
Facsimile: (801) 377-4991
E-Mail; Last name First initial@hlpattorneys.com
[Example: HowardJ@hlpattorneys.com]
File No. 26,372

Phillip E. Lowry
Kenneth Parkinson
Helen H. Anderson
Sean M. Petersen
Douglas W. Finch
OF COUNSEL
S. Rex Lewis

March 15,2002
Sent Via Facsimile No. 801-366-6060
Larry S. Jenkins, Esq.
Wood Crapo, LLC
60 East South Temple, #500
Salt Lake City, UT 84111
I received your letter today. Sorry to hear about your conclusion. My reply will include some
treatise references. Perhaps that will assist your analysis.
As far as your petition is concerned, Utah has no personal jurisdiction over my client, so he
cannot be served with it. I invite you to attempt to do so. (B B D. does not apply here). 1, of course,
will not accept service, merely being enlisted to challenge jurisdiction in the other proceeding.
Inasmuch as your client has been burned very badly in the past in attempts to avoid the requirements
of due process over natural fathers, I am sure you will advise them to proceed with the utmost
caution. If you attempt to secure judicial approval for service, I trust you will not attempt to do so
ex parte, as has been done in the past. That, as they say, would be very bad.
In any event, I see your petition as failing for lack of jurisdiction. Perhaps we should
concentrate on the instant dispute that is perfected before the court instead of what is in my opinion
a jurisdiction!ess goose chase.
I trust you see that my client is in earnest. This will be a long road.
Thank you for your time. I will be in touch with my reply very soon.
Very truly yours,
HOWARD, LEWIS & PETERSEN

Phillip E. Lowry
PEL/mc
J:\PEIAOSBORNE

Fourth judicial District Court
of Utah County, State of uiah
' Z-la-nf^—

.Deputy

IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
IN THE MATTER OF:
KENNETH SKYLER BAKER, m,

MEMORANDUM DECISION
Case No. 022400054

A Minor Child.
Date: March 27, 2002
Judge Steven L. Hansen

Before the Court is Petitioner Adoption Center of Choice's Motion to Allow Petition for
Determination of Birth Father's Rights to Be Heard Without Notice. The Court, having reviewed
and considered Petitioner's memorandum, now grants Petitioner's Motion.
FACTS
1.

Adoption Center of Choice ("Adoption Center") is an adoption agency licensed by the

State of Utah.
2.

On August 6, 2002, A.B. gave birth in Utah to a baby boy known as Kenneth Skyler

Baker, HI.
3.

On January 4, 2002, A.B. relinquished Kenneth to Adoption Center to be placed for

adoption in Utah. Adoption Center has since placed Kenneth for adoption.
4.

On January 15, 2002, A.B.'s husband, who is not the birth father but is the legal father,

gave written consent to Kenneth's placement for adoption.
5.

Frank Osborne, a resident of the State of North Carolina, claims to be Kenneth's birth

father. Osborne has filed a verified petition challenging subject matter jurisdiction of the Court in
this matter.
6.

Adoption Center conducted several searches through the state registrar of vital statistics

to ascertain whether anyone hadfilednotice of the initiation of paternity proceedings. As of
February 27, 2002, no one, including Osborne, hadfiledpaternity proceedings in Utah.

ANALYSIS AND RULING
Adoption Center is seeking an order of the Court that notice of the determination of birth
father's rights is not required to be served on the putative birth father, Frank Osborne. Adoption
Center argues that Osborne has failed to preserve any right he may have had to the child under the
Utah adoption statute.
When a child is placed for adoption, the requirements for an unmarried birth father to
preserve his right to notice under the Utah adoption statute are as follows: (1) he must initiate
paternity proceedings in accordance with the Utah Code, and (2) he must file notice of the
paternity proceedings with the state registrar of vital statistics. Utah Code Ann. § 78-304.13(2)(b) (2001). Both of the requirements must be met "prior to the mother's execution of
consent or her relinquishment to an agency." § 78-30-4.13(3)(a).
The legislature has stated very clearly that "[a]n unmarried biological father, by virtue of
the fact that he has engaged in a sexual relationship with a woman, is deemed to be on notice that
. . . and adoption proceeding . . . may occur, and has a duty to protect his own rights and
interests." § 78-30-4.13(1). If the unmarried biological father does not strictly comply with the
statutory requirements, he "is deemed to have waived and surrendered any right in relation to the
child, including the right to notice of any judicial proceeding in connection with the adoption of
the child, and his consent to the adoption of the child is not required." § 78-30-4.14(5).
The Utah Supreme Court interpreted the adoption statute requirements in In re Adoption
ofB.B.D., 984 P.2d 967 (Utah 1999). This Court finds that the principles articulated by In re
B.B.D. apply squarely here as well. The father in that case "failed to take any action to establish
paternity according to [Utah's] statutory scheme," id. at 971, and so waived and surrendered any
right he had to his child. Osborne has similarly not complied with the legal requirements for
preserving his parental rights under Utah law, and so is not entitled to notice of the petition for
determination of birth father's rights.
CONCLUSION
The Court concludes that because Osborne has not met the strict requirements of the Utah

adoption statutes for preserving his rights, he is not entitled to notice of the petition for
determination of birth father's rights. Therefore, Adoption Center's Motion is granted.
Petitioner's counsel is to prepare an order consistent with this ruling and submit it for the
Court's signature.

DATED this

"2ff day of.
BY THE COURT

.^R;-,

CERTIFICATE OF NOTIFICATION
I c e r t i f y t h a t a copy of t h e a t t a c h e d d o c u m e n t was s e n t t o t h e
f o l l o w i n g p e o p l e f o r c a s e 022400054 by t h e m e t h o d and on t h e d a t e
specified.
METHOD
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Dated this 1r-\
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LARRY S JENKINS
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500 EAGLE GATE TOWER
60 EAST SOUTH TEMPLE
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PHILLIP E. LOWRY (6603), for:
HOWARD, LEWIS & PETERSEN, P.C.
ATTORNEYS AND COUNSELORS AT LAW
120 East 300 North Street
P.O. Box 1248
Provo, Utah 84603
Telephone: (801) 373-6345
Facsimile: (801)377-4991

Our File No. 26,372

Attorneys for Plaintiff

IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

FRANK OSBORNE,
Petitioner,
AFFIDAVIT OF SANDRA BRIDGES
vs.

Case No. 20020489

ADOPTION CENTER OF CHOICE, a
Utah Corporation, JOHN DOE and JANE
DOE, Adoptive Parents,
Respondents.

STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA

)

COUNTY OF GASTON

)

ss.
SANDRA BRIDGES, being duly sworn, states:
1.

I am the step-mother of Frank Osborne, the plaintiff herein.

2.

I have retained on my answering machine messages left on Frank's behalf from the

birth mother, Angela Baker. The messages are dated December 30,2001, January 3,2002, January
8, 2002, and January 10, 2002.
3.

On June 24,002,1 participated in atelephone conversation with Frank's attorney, Mr.

JLK-2S-2032

10'51

Phillip Lowry

-OUWD LEU IS and r€TE°SEN

Attached hereto as Exhibit A is an accurate transcription of that telephone

conversation, and attached hereto as exhibit Bis a true and actual recording of the conversation The
conversation contained a replaying of the phone messages I referred to above.
DATED thufw^dav of June, 2002.

SUBSCRIBED and sworn to before me this^-^faav of June, 2002.

SY PUBLIC
NCTAR1

rs^/rs^

*%>
DATED t h i s ^ g g ^ day of June, 2002

PHILLIP E. LOWRY, for:
HOWARD, LEWIS & PETERSEN
Attorneys fox Petitioner Frank Osborne
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing was mailed, postage pre-paid,
to the following this 2^" day of June, 2002.
Larry S. Jenkins, Esq.
Wood Crapo, LLC
60 East South Temple, #500
Salt Lake City, UT 84111
•1

ATTORNEY
J:\PEL\OSBORNE BRIDGES SANDRA.AFF

Phillip Lowry's conversation with Sandra Bridges, June 24, 2002.
Mr. Lowiy: This is Phillip Lowry. I am having a conversation with Sandi'a Bridges. Would you
please identify yourself, Ms. Bridges?
Ms. Bridges: Yes, Sandra Bridges.
Mr. Lowiy: Are you related to the petitioner in the current case pending in the Court of Appeals,
Frank Osborne?
Ms. Bridges: Yes, he is my stepson.
Mr. Lowiy: Have you ever taken messages for Mi*. Osborne at your home in the past?
Ms. Bridges: Yes.
Mr. Lowry: Were those messages left on your answering machine?
Ms. Bridges: Yes they were, some of them were.
Mr. Lowry: Is one of those messages the subject of the original UCCJEA Petition that Mr. Osbome
signed?
Ms. Bridges: Yes.
Mr. Lowry: And is it a message concerning that Frank would "Have no chance in Hell" of getting
the baby back in Utah?
Ms. Bridges: Yes.
Mr. Lowiy: Do you still have the recordings of those messages?
Ms. Bridges: I have one recording of that message, yes.
Mr. Lowiy: And are there other messages that preceded that message?
Ms. Bridges: Yes. In order to get to that one, you have to hear the others.
Mr. Lowry: How many are there?
Ms. Bridges: There are three.
Mr. Lowry: Before the fourth one?
Ms. Bridges: Right, before you get to the fourth one, yes.

Mr. Lowry: Ok. Can you tell me the dates those messages were left?
Ms. Bridges: Yes. One was on December 30, Saturday; January 3, Thursday; January 8, Tuesday;
January 10, Thursday.
Mr. Lowry: Now how do you know those days of the week?
Ms. Bridges: Well, I know that they're right because right after Christmas and she even mentions
Christmas. I keep an address log book on a message book. I know they are right.
Mr. Lowry: Does the answering machine actually state the days of the week the messages were left?
Ms. Bridges: Yes they do.
Mr. Lowry: Do those tags occur at the beginning or at the end of the messages?
Ms. Bridges: At the end.
Mr. Lowry: Ok. Can you play me those four messages now straight through?
Ms. Bridges: Yes.
Messagel: You have 19 old messages. Hey Sandie, this is Angela. I hope y'all had a good
Christmas, [unintelligible]. I guess I'll be able to talk to you tomorrow. I need some things for the
baby and I wondered if y' all would be willing to get em. If not, that's fine, I'll sell some of Frank's
tools and go get em. Just give me a call tomorrow and we'll work it out. However, he's gettin real
low on clothes and the clothes that he got for Christmas is stuff that he can't use for 3 or 4 more
months. I need to take the [unintelligible] now and I've probably got about 5 more days and I will
need more diapers & stuff. Just give me a call and tell me what you want to do. Bye. Saturday,
8:03 p.m.
Message 2: Y'all need to quit fuckin with me about these tools. When my grandmother gets
her six grand, you know what I'm fuckin' talking about Frank. You'll get your Goddamn tools.
Thursday, 9:34p.m.
Message 3:1 just want you guys to know something that car* was mine before I even left for
Utah. Thank God for my grandmother's church. Thursday, 11:58p.m.
Message 4: [unintelligible] Frank's got back together with me so y'all could try to get the
baby in his name. I wouldn't do that cuz I didn't know who the father was. And it makes all perfect
sense now why he would want to get back together with it being so bad. And you know what the
truth is? I got all this stuff recorded. And y'all are not gonna win. You all can't fight the State of
Utah. And you aint got a chance in fuckin' hell. That baby is supposed to be with a family that
loves him and he won't be j erked around in a bunch of bull shit. That you have [unintelligible]. You
know what? You are so fucked up. Bye. Thursday, 10:36 a.m.

STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA
COUNTY OF GASTON

IN THE GENERAL COURT OF JUST%E
DISTRICT COURT DIVISION ^ < r< Jff:
V
02CvD 478
<j y

FRANK OSBORNE,

X

)

\

PLAINTIFF,

vs.
ANGELA CATHERINE BAKER,
ADOPTION CENTER OF CHOICE,
INC., JOHN DOE AND JANE DOE,
DEFENDANT

TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER

This matter coming on before the undersigned presiding Judge of the Civil District Court,
upon Plaintiffs motion for a temporary restraining order herein;froman examination of
the file materials, the presentation of counsel, the verified pleadings filed herein, and
other evidence presented, the Court makes the following Findings of Fact:
1. Plaintiff is a citizen of Gaston County, North Carolina.
2. Defendant corporation is a Utah corporation, organized and operating in Orem,
Utah, and advertising on the Internet and soliciting in all states for children for its
adoption services.
3. Plaintiff alleges that he is the natural father of the minor child Kenneth Osborne,
although paternity has not yet been established by judicial proceeding..
Plaintiff alleges: that he lived together with defendant Angela Baker in Stanley,
Gaston County, for more than six months and up to the date of the birth of the
child Kenneth Osborne; Plaintiff and Angela Baker have never been married and,
on the date of the birth of the child, Angela Baker was married to another man,
who has released any right or interest in the minor child; that, just prior to the
birth of the child, Angela Baker went to the state of Utah, for reasons which were
unknown to the Plaintiff; that, immediately after giving birth to the child on
August 6, 2001, Angela Baker returned to the state of North Carolina, arriving
there on August 9, 2001.; that Angela Baker resided with plaintiff, the minor
child, and other persons at the places and upon the dates described in the

Complaint herein, until January 4, 2002. Ms. Baker upon information and belief
ihen took the child again to the state of Utah, there to give the child up for
adoption via Defendant corporation's agency; that, thereafter, Plaintiff filed this
action in Gaston County, North Carolina, pursuant to the North Carolina Child
Custody Jurisdiction Act, GS 50A et seq., on February 11, 2002.
5. Jurisdiction in this matter, pursuant to the UCCJA, vests in the state of North
Carolina as follows:
50A-201. Initial child-custody jurisdiction.
(a) Except as otherwise provided in G.S. 50A-204, a court of this State
has jurisdiction to make an initial child-custody determination only if:
(1) This State is the home state of the child on the date
of the commencement of the proceeding, or was the home
state of the child within six months before the
commencement of the proceeding, and the child is absent
from this State but a parent or person acting as a
parent continues to live in this State;
(2) A court of another state does not have jurisdiction
under subdivision (1), or a court of the home state of
the child has declined to exercise jurisdiction on the
ground that this State is the more appropriate forum
under G.S. 50A-207 or G.S. 50A-208, and:
a. The child and the child's parents, or the child and
at least one parent or a person acting as a
parent, have a significant connection with this
State other than mere physical presence; and
b. Substantial evidence is available in this State
concerning the child's care, protection, training,
and personal relationships;
(3) All courts having jurisdiction under subdivision (1) or
(2) have declined to exercise jurisdiction on the
ground that a court of this State is the more
appropriate forum to determine the custody of the child
under G.S. 50A-207 or G.S, 50A-208; or
(4) No court of any other state would have jurisdiction
under the criteria specified in subdivision (1), (2),
or (3).
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(b) Subsection (a) is the exclusive jurisdictional basis for making a childcustody determination by a court of this State.
(c) Physical presence of, or personal jurisdiction over, a party or a child
is not necessary or sufficient to make a child-custody determination.
6. That this Gaston County action is presently pending, Plaintiff having effected
service and an entry of default having been made in the absence of afiledanswer.
7. Plaintiff alleges that, while he is now aware of the intentions of Angela Baker, he
remains unaware of: the present status of the presumptive Utah adoption
proceeding; the location of the court in which such an action is located; and the
names of the potential adoptive parents (defendants Doe herein.).
8. While Utah law has no provision for special appearances, Plaintiff has endeavored
through several Utah venues to challenge the jurisdiction of the Utah courts; to
enjoin the adoption proceeding; and to obtain, by subpoena and otherwise, the
names of the adoptive parents, in order to facilitate obtaining the above
information. Citing confidentially provisions and the requirements of Utah law,
Defendant corporation has successfully opposed the disclosure.
9. Jurisdiction appears to be in North Carolina under the provisions of the UCCJA,
which applies to this situation.
10. Plaintiff alleges that Utah law further provides for a period of custody of the child
with the adoptive parents, that being six months, after which the adoption
proceedings may then become final. Upon information and belief this period is
about to expire, with the result that a final order of adoption may immediately
issue.
11. The Court has before it no evidence of compliance with the provisions of the
Interstate Compact for Placement of Children.
12. Plaintiff requests the issuance of a temporary restraining order and injunctive
relief against The Adoption Center of Choice Inc. in going forward with this
matter, in order to prevent the foreclosure of the parental rights of the Plaintiff
while this case proceeds.

13. That this proceeding,-and any orders resulting therefrom, should be given full
faith and credit by the Utah courts.
Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact, the Court makes Conclusions of Law as
follows:
1. That the Court has jurisdiction over the nature and pendency of this action.
2. That irreparable harm would result, were this Temporary Restraining Order not to
issue, in that the rights of the Plaintiff herein may be permanently affected by the
entry of a final determination of the status of the minor child prior to the hearing
of this matter by a court of appropriate jurisdiction.
Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, the court hereby
orders as follows:
1. That The Adoption Center of Choice, Inc. be and is ordered to refrain from taking
any steps to further prosecute or perfect any Utah court proceeding affecting
Plaintiffs parental rights, specifically any adoption proceeding now pending and
involving the minor child Kenneth Osborne (case number and other identifying
information unknown).
2. That a hearing concerning continued injunctive relief shall beheld in Courtroom
3 j l ° f t h e Gaston County Courthouse on July ^ 2002
3. That Plaintiff herein shall post a bond with the Clerk of Court of Gaston County,
North Carolina in the amount of %3MK&>

:OPY
. COURT

Issued this the ^ f day of July, 2002, at && _p. m

Judge Dennis Redwing
District Court Judge Presiding .
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PHILLIP E. LOWRY (6603), for:
HOWARD, LEWIS & PETERSEN, P.C.
ATTORNEYS AND COUNSELORS AT LAW
120 East 300 North Street
P.O. Box 1248
Provo, Utah 84603
Telephone: (801) 373-6345
Facsimile: (801) 377-4991

Our File No. 26,372

Attorneys for Petitioner

IN THE UTAH SUPREME COURT

FRANK OSBORNE,
Petitioner,
vs.
ADOPTION CENTER OF CHOICE, a
Utah Corporation, J. S. and S. S.,
Adoptive Parents,

MEMORANDUM SUPPORTING
PETITIONER'S MOTION TO
CORRECT AND SUPPLEMENT HIS
CERTIORARI PETITION WITH
FACTS ARISING OUT OF THE
NORTH CAROLINA PROCEEDINGS
Case No. 20020515-SC

Plaintiff Frank Osborne ("Osborne") has filed a Motion to Correct and Supplement his
Petition for Certiorari with information just received from the North Carolina court.
The Petitioner's motion concerns the receipt on August 12,2002, of a copy of a Preliminary
Injunction by the General Court of Justice, District Court Division, Gaston County, North Carolina,
case 02CvD 478. That Injunction enjoins the Adoption Center of Choice from proceeding with
finalization of the adoption at issue in this matter. A copy of this order is attached as Exhibit A.
Also attached as Exhibit B is a letter sent to the North Carolina court by the Adoption Center's

counsel defending the issue of granting the injunction on the merits. This constitutes a general
appearance by the Adoption Center, and validates the North Carolina court's conclusion that it has
jurisdiction over both the subject matter and the person in issuing its Injunction.
The detailed opinion of the North Carolina court betrays the graveness of the matter as
viewed by that State. This is yet additional grounds for this Court to consider the matter on
certiorari.
This memorandum contains the pith of the supplementation and correction requested. Thus,
in lieu of submitting pages to be inserted, Petitioner requests that the Court incorporate the contents
of this memorandum by reference into the body of the Petition should it grant the motion to correct
and supplement. Accordingly, ten copies of this memorandum and exhibits are submitted for the
Court's consideration.
DATED this 13th day of August, 2002.

/
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PHILLIP E . l 5 ^ x ) f o r :
HOWARD, LEWIS & PETERSEN
Attorneys for Petitioner Frank Osborne

MAILING CERTIFICATE
'JV'1

«25

I hereby certify that p true and correct copy of the foregoing was mailed to the following,
postage prepaid, this ID

day of August, 2002.

Larry S. Jenkins, Esq.
Wood Crapo, LLC
60 East South Temple, #500
Salt Lake City, UT 84111

Adoptive Parents J.S. and S.S
3430 Charlesworth Circle
West Jordan, UT 84088

ATTORNEY

J:\PEL\osborne memo motion cert correction and to supplement.wpd
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STATE OK NORTII CAROLINA
TN-"»$ GENERAL COURT OF JI 'SI ICE
COUNTY 01- GASTON
2M J<)> - - D I - S T R I C r COURT DIVISION
?A
' ^,1 fo&vD 478
JM'

FRANK OSBORNE,
PLAINTIFF,

'} '
)

"•i-1—

)
)

vs.
)
ANGELA C ATI1ERINE BAKER,
)
ADOPTION CENTER OF CHOICE, )
INC., JOHN DOE AND JANE DOE, ) PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION
Dlil'ENDANT
)

This matter corning on before the undersigned presiding Judge of the Civil District Court,
after the granting of a temporary restraining order pursuant to Rule 65 of the North
Carolina Rules of Civil Procedure, and upon application for a Preliminary Injunction
herein; from an examination of the file materials, the presentation of counsel the verified
pleadings filed herein, and other evidence presented, the Court makes the following
Findings of Fact:

1. That the Findings of Fact contained in the Temporary Restraining Orriei issued
previously are incorporated herein by reference as if fully set out hcrcm.

2: The Court acknowledges that it has considered the full record of proceedings in
the Utah Courts, as per the Record on Appeal submitted to the Utah appellate
court, before issuing this Injunction, and in fact had considered trr.isc materials
before issuing the Temporary Restraining Order in the case.

3. The Court further acknowledges receipt of a letter dated July 3, 2002, from
attorney Larry Jenkins, representing the Adoption Center of Choice. Inc., and
enclosing three exhibits: a Memorandum Decision regarding the quashing of a
subpoena; an Order regarding Birth Father's Rights; and an Order riled July 2,
2001 and entered by the Utah Court of Appeals.

4. The materials submitted and decided through the Utah courts appear to make t\u>
central points. The first is that Plaintiff herein has failed to assert certain rights (or
^perhaps more appropriately, responsibilities) under Utah law which, under this
factual situation, appear to have accrued and been waived before Plaintiff had any
knowledge of the need to assert them, and therefore that Plaintiff has lost those
"rights". The second asserts that Plaintiff ''cannot simply stand on the sidelines
and claim that the Utah courts lack jurisdiction over him". Opinion at page 3.

5. While this Court does not attempt to reach any conclusion regarding LUah law, it
does conclude that such a consideration is unnecessary and inappropriate. The
UCCJEA appears to be directly applicable io this situation as relates to North
Carolina law; under that act, Plaintiff herein appears to have made a prima facie
showing that North Carolina is the *'home state" of the child as defined therein.
While Defendant points out that the UCCJLA does not apply to adoption
proceedings, there is no such proceeding involved in North Carolina, and
exclusive, original jurisdiction is conferred in North Carolina under ihc statute.
This jurisdiction must not and should not be abrogated by a proceeding in another
Stale which would render these proceedings moot.

6. It appears that this case is governed by Interstate Compact on the Placement of
Children, NCOS 110-57.1 et seq, and thai the Compact has in no way been
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complied with, as Compact supervisor Patricia Hovis indicates in her letter,
contained in the appellate record.
In a factually similar case.
When the Compact is read in its entirety, it is apparent thai Article
Vlli(a) contemplates the exclusion from the operation of the Compact of
the sending of a child by a parent, relative, or guardian who possesses the
full legal right to plan for the welfare of the child, see Hartiield, 68 Neb.
L Rev. at 311, and simply leaving the child with a relative or nonagency
guardian in another state. The plain meaning of the phrase "and leaving
the child with" in Article VHI(a) contemplates an arrangement made for
care of the child of a family character, and does not encompass placement
of the child for adoption, which the provisions of the Compact expressly
govern. Even if plaintiffs are "nonagency guardians" as they contend,
because the record establishes tliat defendants sent the child to plaintiffs in
North Carolina as a preliminary to a possible adoption by plaintiffs, and
did not simply ffleav[e] the child with" plaintiffs, we reject plaintiffs'
argument that Article VIII(a) excludes the instant case from the operation
of the Compact
[2] Plaintiffs argue that defendants are not the "sending agency" as that
term is used in the Compact, and thus the retention of jurisdiction
provisions do not apply to defendants. We disagree.
The Compact defines the term "sending agency" as
a party state officer or employee thereof; a
subdivision of a party state, or officer or
employee thereof; a court of a party state; a
person, corporation, association, charitable
agency or other entity which sends,
brings, or causes to be sent or.brought
any child to another party state.
N.C.G.S. 110-57.1, art. 11(b) (1991) (emphasis added). "The definition of
sending agency is broad enough to include any individual or entity,
including a parent. . . , that causes a child to be moved interstate.11
llartfield, 68 Neb. L. Rev. at 309. The.Compact in pertinent part provides
that, prior to sending any child into a receiving state as a preliminary to a
possible adoption, the sending agency shall furnish the appropriate public
authority in the receiving state (which in North Carolina i> the Department
of Human Resources, see id. art. 11(c)) with written notice ol'ibe intention

to send the child into the receiving state. Id. art. 111(b). The ('ompact
further provides that
ft]he sending agency shall retain jurisdiction
over the child sufficient to determine all
matters in relation to the custody,
supervision, care, treatment and disposition
of the child which it would have had if the
child had remained in the sending agency's
state, until the child is adopted
Such jurisdiction shall also include the power
to effect or cause the return of the child or
its transfer to another location and custody
pursuant to law.
Id. art. V(a) (emphasis added).
Standi v. Brock (N.C. App>), 425 SU 2d 446 (1993),

7. The Court dopes not address the applicability of the PKPA, the Parental
Kidnapping Prevention Act, TO this situation,-as such an analysis is unnccessar>
in view of the ruling of the Court.

8. The court reaffirms the findings made in the Temporary Restraining Order herein
without duplicating those findings.

Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact, the Court makes Conclusions of Law as
follows:
1-. That the Court has jurisdiction over the nature and pendency of this sciion.

2. That irreparable harm would result, were this Injunction not to issue, in that
rights of the Plaintiff herein may be permanently affected by the entry of a i
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deteimination of the status of the minor child prior to the hearing of this matter by
a court of appropriate jurisdiction.

Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conchisions of Law, the cou'i h;reby
orders as follows:

That, pending further orders of the Court, The Adoption Center of Choice, Inc.,
continues to be and is ordered to refrain from taking any steps to further prosecute or
perfect any Utah court proceeding affecting Plaintiffs parental rights, specifically
any adoption proceeding now pending and involving the minor child Kenneth
Osborne (case number and other identifying information unknown).

Issued this the J^ day of July, 2002.

Judge Dennis Redwing
District Court Judge Presiding .
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July 3, 2002
i?v Federal Express
The Honorable Dehnis J. Redwing
General Court^f Justice
District Codrt Division
Gastoiy£ounty Courthouse
325 North Marietta Street
G^stonia, North Carolina 28052
Re: Osborne v. J3nter, c/ a/., Case No. 02 CvD 478
Dear Judge Redv* ing:
I represent Adoption Center of Choice, which apparently is a named defendant in
the referenced action, but which has never been served. Today, I received in the mail a copy of
a temporary restraining order your honor signed on July 1, 2002. I am not licensed in North
Carolina, but while we attempt to retain counsel there, if that becomes necessary, 1 wanted to get
in your hands copies of rulings courts in Utah have made concerning Mr. Osborne and the child
at issue. I do not believe counsel for Mr. Osborne provided your honor with copies of these, or
your decision on the temporary restraining order may have been different. It may be that Mr.
Osborne's North Carolina counsel is not aware of these rulings.
These documents are as follows:
. 1.
A March 18,2002 ruling by the Fourth District Court siltinji in Utah
County, Uiah, that "Frank Osborne has not complied with the legal requirements Un preserving
his parental rights under Utah law." Exhibit A at 3, which is a copy of the Memorandum
Decision. Thai court also ruled that "Osborne has failed to lake any action according to the
statutory requirements, and so has waived any right to Kenneth he may have olhervvi.se had.M Id.
2
In that same Memorandum Decision, the Fourth District Court also titled
that the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act (fc4\ JCCJf.A"). i Itah Code
Ann. §§ 78-45c- i 01 to 31 8, does not apply to "an adoption proceeding" and, then fore, the court

The Honorable Dennis j . Redwing
July 3, 2002
Page 2

concluded thai the UCCJEA did not apply to the proceedings Mr. Osborne had brought before it
Id. at 4. See Utah Code Ann. §78-45c-103. This is the same uniform act thai Mr Osborne used
as the basis foi obtaining the temporary restraining order from your honor. I note that N.C. Gen.
Stat. Ann. § 50A-1CH similarly provides that the UCCJEA ''does not govern an adoption
proceeding
?
On or about April 8, 2002, the Fourth District Court entered an order
finding that ^ny person claiming to be the putative father of Kenneth Baker, including Frank
Osborne, twis deemed to have waived and surrendered any right in relation to the minor child.
including the ri^ht to notice of any judicial proceeding in connection with the adoption of the
child, and his consent to the adoption of the child is not required." Exhibit B, which is a copy of
the Order Regarding Birth Father's Rights entered by the Fourth District Court.
4
On July 2, 2002, the Utah Court of Appeals ruled that "Petitioner [Frank
Osborne] has simply failed to take any timely action to preserve his rights Lo this child."
Exhibit C, which is a copy of the Order of the Utah Court of Appeals denying Mr. Osborne's
petition for a writ of mandamus and temporary restraining order.
1 believe it is important for your honor to have these court orders jnd rulings
before making further decisions in this case. If any questions or issues can be resolved by
conference call between your honor, Mr. Osborne's counsel, and mc, 1 am available July 5, 8.
and 9.
Thank you for considering these materials.
Sincerely,

Enclosures
cc: Thomas H. Kakassy (with enclosures)
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This case is before the court on plaintiffs motions for writ of habeas corpus
and for writ of mandamus. The matter was heard in a day-long evidentiary hearing
on October 23, 2000, at which the birth mother, the birth father and the social
worker with Adoption Center of Choice each testified.1 Having heard the evidence
and the arguments of counsel, I now issue this ruling granting issuance of both

1

Each of these three witnesses flew to Utah to testify, the birth parents from Alabama and the
social workerfromFresno, California, to which she has relocated following the incidents givingriseto
this action. This travel underscores the point made hereafter, that it is curious that the Utah court was
involved in this matter in thefirstplace.
1

writs.
FACTUAL FINDINGS
I find that the following facts have been proven by clear and convincing
evidence:2
1.

A child was born on September 1, 1999, to Emily Shawnee Taylor

("Emily") at UAB Hospital in Birmingham, Alabama.
2.

At the time of conception and at the time of delivery of the child,

Emily was married to Larry Taylor ("Larry").
3.

Though married, Emily and Larry were living separate from one

another at the time of conception and at the time of delivery.
4.

Around the time of conception Emily was involved in an extra-

marital, sexual affair with Norberto Vazquez, Jr. ("Norberto").
5.

Emily, Norberto and Larry each believed that the child born on

September 1, 1999, was the child of Emily and Norberto, and that Larry was not a
biological parent of the child.
6.

This belief was fueled by the fact that Larry had a vasectomy several

years before Emily's conception in this case.

2

Under Utah Code Ann. § 78-3a-406(3), decisions to terminate parentalrightsmust be based
upon clear and convincing evidence. In this case, because of the allegedly dire consequences which may
flowfroma ruling in favor of Norberto, I have evaluated the evidence by that standard. Arguably, that
standard is unfair to Noiberto as it may place a heavier burden upon him than appropriate if he is
seeking to set aside the termination of his parentalrights.Because I am not now determining the merits
of whether his termination should be set aside, only whether the parents must submit to the Utah court
on this issue and whether they must be identified, and because I conclude Norberto meets the clear and
convincing standard on the facts now before the court, my decision to use this standard of evidence
results in no prejudice to either party.
2

7.

Norberto was with Emily at the hospital at the time of delivery of the

8.

At the hospital the child was given the name of Jacob Josiah Rivera

child.

Vazquez, and that name was placed on the child's birth certificate.
9.

After delivery, an employee of the hospital assisted Emily in filling

out the papers for the baby's birth certificate and the employee attempted to place
Larry's name on the paper work as the birth father.
10.

Emily protested, asserting that the child was the son of Norberto and

asked that Norberto's name be placed on the birth certificate as the father.
11.

The hospital employee said this could not be done because Emily

was married to Larry.
12.

As a result of this disagreement, the child's birth certificate did not

name any individual as father, neither Larry nor Norberto.
13.

After the delivery Emily moved into the home of Norberto with their

14.

After the child was born Emily lived with Norberto for two weeks.

child.

They had afightand she moved out. Thereafter, until March 2000, Emily and the
child lived with Norberto in a tumultuous, off-again, on-again relationship.
15.

During one of the periods when they were apart Emily began the

process to change the child's last name to her maiden name, though she never
completed the process and the child retained the surname of Vasquez.
16.

The child's social security card was issued in the name of Vasquez.
3

17.

Every time that Emily moved out of Norberto's residence, after a

few days he would go looking for her and for his child. He usually found her and
persuaded her to move back in with him.
18.

In February 2000, after anotherfightwith Emily, Norberto wanted

to pick up his child for visitation but the police intervened. They would not allow
his pick up of the child because Norberto's name was not on the birth certificate.
19.

As a result, since at least February 2000, Norberto has known that

he had not been named on the birth certificate as the child's father.
20.

From the time of the child's birth until March 2000, Norberto

providedfiindsfor most of the child's daily needs, including funds to purchase a car
seat, stroller, crib, clothes, diapers, formula and other needs. He also provided a
significant share of the living expenses for Emily during that time.
21.

Norberto also bought Christmas gifts for the child for Christmas

22.

In March 2000, Emily was again living with Norberto, but was

1999.

greatly depressed. Larry had custody of her other children and she was living with
Norberto and their son Jacob.
23.

While in that depressed state, Emily decided she wanted to adopt

out her child, and she called an adoption agency listed in the local phone directory:
Heart of Gold.
24.

Heart of Gold is a referring adoption agency located in California,

and it referred Emily by telephone to Adoption Center of Choice located in Utah.
4

25.

Ultimately, and without any discussion of the matter with Norberto

with whom she was residing, Emily made arrangements toflyto Utah to place the
child for adoption.
26.

On March 21, 2000, Emily called Norberto at his work and asked

that after work he bring home some cigarettes and drinksfromthe store so that
they could party that evening.
27.

Immediately thereafter she called a cab and went to the airport,

where a ticket was waiting.
28.

Sheflewto Utah with the child.

29.

Emily spent almost two weeks in Utah where she was introduced to

the proposed adoptive parents and she learned their names and identities.
30

During all of that time she resided in a hotel paid for by the

Adoption Center of Choice.
31.

On April 10, 2000, Emily signed a relinquishment and allowed Jacob

to be placed with the proposed adoptive parents, who were residents of the State of
Washington.
32.

The adoptive parents came to Utah to take physical custody of the

child and thus submitted themselves to the laws of the State of Utah.
33.

During the process with the Adoption Center of Choice, the

adoptive parents were advised that this adoption was a "high risk" adoption as the
Adoption Center of Choice did not have any relinquishment or consentfromthe
child's birth father, Norberto.
5

34.

Notwithstanding that no consent or relinquishment had been

obtainedfromNorberto, the adoptive parents took physical custody of the child and
left the State of Utah for their home in Washington.
35.

No proceedings were commenced in Utah to terminate Norberto's

parental rights until May 25, 2000, more than a month and a half after the adoptive
parents took physical custody of the child.
36.

During all of that time, and since, the adoptive parents were aware

of theriskthat the natural father may have some claim to the child.
37.

The Adoption Center of Choice has informed the adoptive parents of

this proceeding.
38.

There is no significant unfairness to the adoptive parents if their

identities are disclosed to Norberto as they allowed their identities to be known to
Emily.
39.

From the time that Emily left Norberto's home on March 21, 2000,

until May 2000, Norberto had no idea where she was nor where his child was. He
made several attempts to locate her, even contacting her husband Larry, and was
told that nobody knew where she was.
40.

Unlike the other times when Emily had left his home, this time he

could notfindher or his child.
41.

During the process of the adoption, Emily told the Adoption Center

of Choice that she did not know where Norberto lived, that she had heardfromher
family members that he had moved from the home where she had lived with him,
6

and that she did not know how to get in contact with him.
42.

These representations were presented in an affidavit which Emily

signed and which wasfiledin this court in case number 002400120.
43.

These representations were false, as Emily knew that the trailer in

which she had lived with Norberto was on a lot behind a home owned by his
grandfather. She knew the address of the grandfather's home and reasonably knew
that the grandfather would know how to contact Norberto. She also knew that in
past instances when she moved out of Norberto's home, he had contacted her
husband, Larry, looking for her, and she reasonably anticipated that he would do so
on this occasion.
44.

Despite this knowledge, Emily did not tell the adoption center that

the address on Adams Avenue where she had lived with Norberto was immediately
behind and on the same lot as his grandfather's home.
45.

While in Utah Emily participated with the Adoption Center of

Choice and its lawyers in proceedings to terminate Norberto's parental rights.
46.

The Adoption Center of Choice instituted the termination

proceedings in case number 002400120.
47.

In that proceeding the Fourth District Court issued an order that

terminated Norberto's parental rights, then ordered thefilesealed.
48.

At the conclusion of the hearing giving rise to this ruling, I issued an

order that the sealed file be unsealed. I have reviewed that file.
49.

The Adoption Center of Choice purported to give notice to
7

Norberto of the termination proceedings taking place in Utah by publishing notice
of the Utah proceedings in the Alabama Messenger, a newspaper of general
circulation in Jefferson County, Alabama, which is the county in which Norberto
and Emily had lived together.
50.

The notice published in the Alabama Messenger was addressed to

the "putative father of Jacob, who was born in Birmingham, Alabama on September
1, 1999, to Emily Shawnee."
51.

This publication was not reasonably calculated to apprise Norberto

of the Utah proceedings as the full name of Jacob, though known to Emily and the
Adoption Center of Choice, was not used nor was Emily's full name used, only her
first and middle names.
52.

Where Emily knew how to get in touch with members of Norberto's

family, and in fact, knew that she had left his residence on Adams Avenue with his
child on March 21, 2000, it was more likely that he could be found by attempting
service at that address than by the published service in the newspaper.
53.

The Adoption Center of Choice also did a paternity search in Utah

which indicated that nobody had filed a claim of paternity with the Utah
Department of Health. This paternity search was not helpful nor probative as
Norberto had no basis to have filed a claim of paternity in Utah. He had no notice
nor idea that the child's mother had taken the child to Utah for the purpose of
placing the child for adoption.
54.

On May 25, 2000, the Adoption Center of Choice filed its action to
8

terminate Norberto's parental rights.
55.

That same day judge of this court signed an order terminating

Norberto's parental rights on the basis of the published notice to Norberto
described above, Emily's affidavit in which she claimed not to know how to contact
Norberto, her relinquishment and the relinquishment of Larry, Emily's legal
husband.
56.

During the six and one-half months from the child's birth on

September 1, 1999, to Emily's departure on March 21, 2000, Norberto purchased
all of the durable goods necessary for the child's care, including a crib, stroller and
car seat; he purchased clothes for the child; he purchased most of the formula for
the child as he purchased a significant quantity, sufficient to meet the child's needs
even when Norberto and Emily were living apart.
57.

During that six months, Norberto paid almost all of the financial

support of the child, providing for his food, clothing and shelter while the child and
Emily lived with him, and even giving Emily money for support of the child during
some of the times that Emily lived apart from Norberto.
58.

During that six months no one else provided significant financial

support for the child.
59.

During that six months Norberto maintained a meaningful, ongoing

relationship with the child, providing actual physical care for the child during the
times that Emily resided with Norberto and visiting and having regular
communication with the child and Emily when she was living apart from Norberto.
9

60.

During that six months Norberto demonstrated a full commitment to

the responsibilities of parenthood as he obtained full-time employment, something
he previously had not had, and he purchased food and clothing for the child and he
arranged for permanent, adequate housing for Emily and the child.
61.

During that six months Norberto developed a substantial relationship

with the child, a relationship which Emily abruptly cut off when she flew, without
any prior warning whatsoever, to place the child for adoption.
62.

Emily actually resided with the child with Norberto for

approximately three or more of the six months from the child's birth until Emily's
departure. She moved in and out several times so it is difficult to determine just
how much she actually lived with him, though it was a significant, on-going
relationship.
63.

For the times when she did not actually reside with Norberto, he still

maintained an ongoing relationship with the child and provided essentially all of his
financial support.
64.

All of these facts support the conclusion that Norberto made

substantial, meaningful efforts to fulfill his parental role as the father of the child.
He was frustrated in this effort by Emily's departure to Utah to place the child for
adoption.
65.

Norberto had no basis to know, when he returned from work on

March 21, 2000, that Emily had gone to Utah to place the child for adoption.
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ANALYSIS AND RULING
In this matter Norberto has complained against the Adoption Center of
Choice, asserting that it caused his parental rights to be terminated without notice
to him. He now seeks a writ of habeas corpus requiring the adoptive parents to
present the child here in court to respond to his claim of parental right to the child
and he seeks a writ of mandamus, compelling the Adoption Center of Choice to
provide identifying information of the adoptive parents so that they may be served
with the writ of habeas corpus. I now issue this ruling granting the issuance of each
writ.
Norberto's parental rights were not properly terminated.
1. Norberto's consent to adoption was required,
Utah Code Ann, § 78-30-4.14(l)(f) provides that an unmarried biological
father of a child must relinquish his child for adoption or consent to the adoption of
his child "only if the requirements of Subsection (2)(a) or (b) have been proven.7'
Subsection (2)(b) does not apply as it governs cases where the child to be
adopted is under six months of age. Here the child was more than six months of
age at the time it was placed for adoption by Emily.
Subsection (2)(a) governs those situations in which the child to be adopted
is more than six months of age and thus controls. It provides:
(2) In accordance with Subsection (1), the consent of an unmarried
biological father is necessary only if the father has strictly complied with the
requirements of this section.
(a) (i) With regard to a child who is placed with adoptive parents
more than six months after birth, an unmarried biological father shall
have developed a substantial relationship with the child, taken some
11

measure of responsibility for the child and the child's future, and
demonstrated a full commitment to the responsibilities of parenthood
by financial support of the child, of a fair and reasonable sum and in
accordance with the father's ability, when not prevented from doing
so by the person or authorized agency having lawful custody of the
child, and either:
(A) visiting the child at least monthly when physically and
financially able to do so, and when not prevented from doing
so by the person or authorized agency having lawful custody
of the child; or
(B) regular communication with the child or with the person
or agency having the care or custody of the child, when
physically and financially unable to visit the child, and when
not prevented from doing so by the person or authorized
agency having lawful custody of the child.
(ii) The subjective intent of an unmarried biological father, whether
expressed or otherwise, unsupported by evidence of acts specified in
this subsection shall not preclude a determination that the father
failed to meet the requirements of this subsection,
(iii) An unmarried biological father who openly lived with the child
for a period of six months within the one-year period after the birth
of the child and immediately preceding placement of the child with
adoptive parents, and openly held himself out to be the father of the
child during that period, shall be deemed to have developed a
substantial relationship with the child and to have otherwise met the
requirements of this subsection.
This is a restrictive statute. Its purpose is to ensure that only unmarried
biological fathers who have both supported the child and maintained meaningful
parental contact with the child need consent to an adoption. Relinquishment or
consent is not required from unmarried biological fathers who do not meet these
requirements.
In this case, the factual findings above support the conclusion that Norberto
met all of the requirements of Subsection (2)(a). The child lived with him for much
of the time from birth on September 1, 1999, to the mother's disappearance on
March 21, 2000. During all of the time that the child actually lived with him,
12

Norberto provided all of the support as Emily did not work while she was residing
with Norberto. There is no question that Norberto took substantial and meaningful
steps to provide for the child's needs. Only Norberto bought the child's car seat,
stroller and crib. Norberto bought most of the child's food for the six months
before the child and mother disappeared. During the time the child lived with
Norberto, he lived in a trailer owned by Norberto's grandfather, but provided to the
couple by Norberto's arrangement with his grandfather.
Norberto also visited with and actually cared for the child as much as the
mother would allow. Consistent with the provisions of subparts (A) and (B), the
only times when Norberto may not have actually visited with the child for more
than a month were periods when the mother was not allowing him visitation.
I find that Norberto complied with all of the requirements of Subsection
(2)(a) and thus, his consent or relinquishment were required before the child could
be placed for adoption.
2. Norberto did not give actual consent to the adoption.
The court file in case number 002400120, the termination file, clearly
reflects that Norberto did not give consent to the adoption.
3. Norberto did not receive either actual or constructive notice of the
termination proceedings.
In this case Norberto's parental rights were terminated by an order of the
court in the termination proceedings. The termination proceedings were
commenced when the Adoption Center of Choice filed a petition to terminate the
13

parental rights. That same day the order was issued. Ifindthe procedure to be
inadequate.
Once a legal proceeding is commenced, the proper way to notify other
parties of the existence of the action is by the service of a summons in accordance
with Rule 4, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. Pvule 4 contemplates personal service
as the standard, but then, also allows a court, in appropriate cases, to authorize
service by publication. Rule 4(g) provides:
(g) Other service. Where the identity or whereabouts of the person
to be served are unknown and cannot be ascertained through reasonable
diligence . . . the party seeking service of process mayfilea motion
supported by affidavit requesting an order allowing service by publication,
by mail, or by some other means. The supporting affidavit shall set forth the
efforts made to identify, locate or serve the party to be served, or the
circumstances which make it impracticable to serve all of the individual
parties. If the motion is granted, the court shall order service of process by
publication. .. provided that the means of notice employed shall be
reasonably calculated, under all the circumstances, to apprise the interested
parties of the pendency of the action to the extent reasonably possible or
practicable. The court's order shall also specify the content of the process to
be served and the event or events as of which service shall be deemed
complete. A copy of the court's order shall be served upon the defendant
with the process specified by the court.
This rule, allowing service by publication, contemplates that the court
approve in advance, pursuant to motion, the request for service by publication.
Contrary to that, in this case the petition for termination and the order each were
filed the same day. The petition was accompanied with service by publication of a
notice as a fait accompli. That is patently improper. There is no court order
approving the necessity for service by publication.
Equally telling, Emily's affidavit, which is the only affidavit supporting the
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claim that Norberto could not be found, was false in critical particulars. She knew
where he lived at the time that she left, for she left his house to get on the plane to
Utah. She knew that his house was directly behind his grandfather's who likely
would know where he had moved to, if in fact he moved as she told the adoption
agency. I find the affidavit to be false, and thus not a proper basis for a claim of
necessity for service by publication.
Finally, and most importantly, the notice published in the Alabama
Messenger was woefully insufficient. It did not contain a case number in which an
objection to the petition for termination could be filed, as the petition had not been
filed, it referred to a procedure under Utah Code Ann. § 78-30-4.7, though that
section was repealed in 1995. It did not accurately identify the child, though his
true and correct legal name was known to the adoption agency. It did not even
accurately identify the mother, as it left off her last name.3 Simply put, the notice
did not provide meaningful notice to the unmarried biological father.
What is most strange is that this court was involved in the first place. Both
of the biological parents resided in Alabama and the prospective adoptive parents
resided in Washington. Why a Utah court was needed in this instance is beyond
me. The adoption agency could have made certain that the mother's consent
complied with Washington law, as the adoption was to befinalizedthere, and it
could have used Washington law to deal with the unmarried biological father.

3

These failures are so pervasive that I question the good faith of the agency. Were these errors
deliberate? Did the agency intentionally obfuscate so that Norberto, the unmarried biological father,
would not actuallyfindout that Emily was participating in termination proceedings in Utah?
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Instead, it filed a petition and persuaded a Utah judge to terminate the parental
rights of an unmarried biological father without complying with the requirements of
Rule 4, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure concerning service and it provided clearly
misleading and unhelpful information in the notice published in the Alabama
Messenger. Simply put, Norberto did not receive either actual or constructive
notice of the proceedings in Utah to terminate his parental rights.
Norberto is entitled to the requested writs.
The parental right is an important, constitutionally protected liberty interest.
As such, it cannot be cut off without due process. See In re J.P., 648 P.2d 1364,
1372-73 (Utah 1982); Troxelv. Granville, 120 S. Ct. 2054, 2059-61 (2000). In
this case, the due process violations were extreme.
The file in the termination proceeding makes clear Norberto did not receive
actual notice of the termination proceedings, no summons or other process was
served upon him, and the published notice was abysmally inadequate. As a result,
there is a substantial likelihood that the attempt by the Utah court to terminate
Norberto's parental rights will fail for lack of due process
While the termination proceeding provides no information as to the identity
of the Washington adoptive parents, that information is known to the Adoption
Center of Choice. At the hearing the Adoption Center's prior social worker
testified that the Washington adoptive parents were informed that this was a "high
risk" adoption as the agency did not have a relinquishment or consent from the
unmarried biological father. Further, I inquired of the social worker and was
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informed that the Washington adoptive parents, though not parties to this action (at
least not yet), have been apprised of this proceeding. Where, as here, the adoptive
parents are aware of this proceeding and were aware at the time that the adoption
was a "high risk" adoption, and because the adoptive parents entered into what is
commonly called an open adoption, with full disclosure to the birth mother of their
identities, no great prejudice will come to the adoptive parents if their identity is
disclosed.4 Further, given the likelihood that Norberto will prevail in an attack on
the termination proceedings, it is appropriate that a writ of mandamus issue
compelling the Adoption Center of Choice to provide identifying information to
Norberto so that he may serve appropriate process on the adoptive parents.
Curiously, the Washington adoptive parents came to Utah to pick up the
child. By purposefully availing themselves of the laws of the State of Utah and by
coming to Utah to take physical custody of the child for adoption, the Washington
adoptive parents have come within the jurisdiction of the Utah courts. As a result,
this court has jurisdiction over the adoptive parents to compel their return, with the
child, to Utah to respond to the father's claim of parenthood.
The father has commenced paternity proceedings in Alabama. Given the
unequivocal testimony of Emily that Norberto is the father of the child, it is likely
Norberto will prevail in his paternity proceedings in Alabama. Further, given the
4

At the hearing it became clear that Norberto's counsel knows at least the names of the
adoptive parents. The adoption was an open adoption and Emily knew the names of and met with the
adoptive parents before relinquishing her child. Prior to the hearing in this case Emily disclosed the
names of the adoptive parents to Norberto's counsel. The writ is nonetheless appropriate as Norberto's
counsel must have sufBcient information tofindand serve the adoptive parents with necessaiy process to
bring all of these issues to resolution.
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flaws in the termination proceedings here in Utah, it is likely Norberto will prevail in
his claim to set aside the termination proceedings As he has a substantial
likelihood of prevailing in his claims, it is appropriate that the adoptive parents, who
availed themselves of the benefit of the laws of Utah and who came here to take
physical custody of the child, should be compelled to present the child before the
Utah court for the purpose of complying with the reasonable requests of this court
or of the Alabama court in proceedings to determine paternity and to determine
whether the father's termination was proper
Plaintiffs requests for entry of a writ of mandamus and a writ of habeas
corpus each are granted Plaintiffs counsel is directed to prepare an appropriate
order and the writs
Dated this _/_ day of November, 2000

BY THE COURT.
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